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COMMENTS
PROSECUTORIAL TRAINING WHEELS:
GINSBURG’S CONNICK V. THOMPSON
DISSENT AND THE TRAINING
IMPERATIVE
Timothy Fry *
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 29, 2011, the Supreme Court released a 5–4 decision in
Connick v. Thompson, 1 reversing an evenly divided en banc decision of the
Fifth Circuit. 2 The Court held that a § 1983 suit could not be used to hold a
prosecutor’s office liable for a single Brady violation by a member of its
staff 3 on the theory that the office provided inadequate training. 4 This
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2005. The author thanks his wife Gretchen for her assistance and support during these last
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Allen, for shaping his understanding of law.
1
131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
2
Thompson v. Connick, 578 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). The en banc Fifth
Circuit split eight judges to eight judges, thus affirming the district court’s opinion allowing
Thompson’s § 1983 suit. Id. at 293. The Fifth Circuit, in granting a rehearing en banc,
Thompson v. Connick, 562 F.3d 711, 711 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated a prior three-judge panel
decision affirming the district court judgment, Thompson v. Connick, 553 F.3d 836, 869 (5th
Cir. 2008).
3
The Brady doctrine has evolved from Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), as
explained infra in notes 116–150 and their accompanying text. The Brady doctrine provides
that the Due Process Clauses, U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, generally require a prosecutor to
hand over “evidence [that] is material either to guilt or to punishment,” Brady, 373 U.S. at
87. Appellate courts ask whether such evidence is “potentially exculpatory” before
reversing verdicts or sentences.
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decision overturned a $14 million jury award to respondent John
Thompson, a former death row inmate who had been exonerated weeks
before his scheduled execution. 5 Beyond merely clarifying the reach of a
failure-to-train claim, 6 the majority and the dissent revealed starkly
different views on training America’s prosecutors.7
In the criminal cases underlying Thompson’s § 1983 suit, the Orleans
Parish District Attorney’s Office in Louisiana tried Thompson separately
for armed robbery and murder and secured convictions at both trials. In
both trials, the prosecutor’s office failed to turn over to the defense material
evidence that cast doubt on Thompson’s guilt—blood tests that indicated he
had not committed the armed robbery and eyewitness testimony suggesting
he was not the murderer. 8 After failing to turn over the blood tests, the
Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office prosecutors secured the armed
robbery conviction. This ensured Thompson would not take the stand in his
own defense at the murder trial, 9 where he was convicted and sentenced to
death. When a defense investigator discovered these undisclosed facts
weeks before Thompson’s scheduled execution, the court promptly reversed
both of Thompson’s convictions. 10
After Louisiana unsuccessfully reprosecuted Thompson for both
crimes, Thompson commenced a § 1983 suit against the Orleans Parish
District Attorney’s Office, prosecutors, and various officials. The only
claim that went to trial alleged a failure to train prosecutors on their Brady
doctrine obligations. 11 The jury awarded $14 million because the district
attorney’s office was “deliberately indifferent to the need to train, monitor,

4

Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (providing claim against
state government for “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws”).
5
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356–57.
6
See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989) (allowing for the possibility of
failure-to-train claims for “deliberately indifferent” standards in preparing city employees).
7
See infra notes 13–19 and accompanying text.
8
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356.
9
Id. To make this point clearer, had Thompson testified at his own murder trial, the
prosecution would have been able to introduce Thompson’s past convictions. Id. at 1373
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); State v. Thompson, 825 So. 2d 552, 556 (La. Ct. App. 2002)
(observing that defense attorneys “advised Mr. Thompson at that time, that should he take
the witness stand, that the fact that he has prior convictions, including the prior conviction
for attempted armed robbery would come up before the jury, which it would not if he didn’t
testify”). Louisiana did not contradict Thompson’s claim that he would have testified at his
murder trial had he not been convicted at the improperly conducted armed robbery trial.
Thompson, 825 So. 2d at 556.
10
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356–57.
11
Id. at 1357.
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and supervise [its] prosecutors to comply with the constitutional
requirements concerning production of evidence favorable to an accused.” 12
The Supreme Court, in reversing, claimed that the plaintiff had not met his
burden because he could not show either an official policy or a pattern of
violations that caused his harm. 13 Justice Thomas, writing for the majority,
read the facts to say that only a single prosecutor withheld the evidence and
Thompson’s case was unique. 14 The office had no notice of Brady
violations to correct through training. 15
Justice Thomas went on to discuss how prosecutors’ offices are
protected more broadly from § 1983 suits because they employ trained
attorneys. Individual prosecutors have received “professional training and
[have] ethical obligations” to inform themselves of the Brady doctrine. 16
Specifically, the attorneys in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office
graduated from law school, passed the Louisiana bar exam, and possibly
attended continuing legal education training; they alone were responsible
for their actions. 17
In an impassioned dissent, Justice Ginsberg took direct aim at whether
this “training” was adequate. She noted that the lead prosecutor’s alma
mater did not require criminal procedure, passing the Louisiana bar exam
did not require knowledge of Brady, and the state did not require continuing
legal education at the time. 18 In her dissent, which she read from the bench,
she reasoned:

12

Thompson v. Connick, No. CIV.A. 03-2045, 2007 WL 1200826, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr.
23, 2007).
13
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1358.
14
Id. at 1364. This statement was made despite, as already mentioned, the failure to
provide Thompson with favorable evidence in two separate prosecutions and, as will be
discussed, the habit of the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office of violating the Brady
doctrine, as evidenced by multiple Supreme Court cases.
15
Id. at 1360.
16
Id. at 1363 (“Prosecutors are not only equipped but are also ethically bound to know
what Brady entails and to perform legal research when they are uncertain.”). Commentators
have heaped scorn on Justice Thomas’s opinion. See, e.g., Susan A. Bandes, The Lone
Miscreant, the Self-Training Prosecutor, and Other Fictions: A Comment on Connick v.
Thompson, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 715, 727–33 (2011) (arguing that the idea of self-training
and self-regulation is a myth); Dahlia Lithwick, Cruel but Not Unusual, SLATE (Apr. 1,
2011, 7:43 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/04/
cruel_but_not_unusual.html (arguing that Justice Thomas’s opinion and Justice Scalia’s
concurrence misread the facts in Connick and showed how they were “pitiless and scornful”
of an innocent man wrongfully prosecuted, and calling the opinion “one of the meanest . . .
decisions ever”).
17
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361–62.
18
Id. at 1385 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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A District Attorney aware of his office’s high turnover rate, who recruits prosecutors
fresh out of law school and promotes them rapidly through the ranks, bears
responsibility for ensuring that on-the-job training takes place. In short, the buck
stops with him. . . . The evidence in this case presents overwhelming support for the
conclusion that the Orleans Parish Office slighted its responsibility to the profession
and to the State’s system of justice by providing no on-the-job Brady training. [The
petitioner district attorney] was not “entitled to rely on prosecutors’ professional
19
training,” for [he] himself should have been the principal insurer of that training.

This Comment corroborates Justice Ginsburg’s view of the necessity
of prosecutor training by exploring the interplay between discretion,
misconduct, and training. Specifically, in Part II, this Comment discusses
how prosecutorial discretion can lead to cases of misconduct, which
complex procedural doctrines like the Brady doctrine have been unable to
eliminate. In Part III, this Comment reveals the weaknesses of current
training regimes, which other proposals have not addressed. Finally, in
Part IV, the Comment turns to a series of modest proposals to incentivize
increased Brady-doctrine training. Without increased training, Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent will continue to echo as an unheeded warning against
prosecutors who fail to provide proper due process protections for the
accused, even those who are innocent.
II. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND ITS LIMITS
A. THE RESPONSIBILITY AND DISCRETION OF A PROSECUTOR
Prosecutors have enormous, wide-ranging discretion to choose what
crimes to investigate, whether to entertain plea bargains, when to grant
immunity to a potential witness, how to organize the state’s case, which
charges to prosecute, and even in which jurisdiction to bring a case. 20
Prosecutors are powerful actors, controlling the criminal justice system with
an outsized impact on the wider political system. 21 Prosecutors’ day-to-day

19

Id. at 1387 (emphases added) (citations omitted).
Geoffrey S. Corn & Adam M. Gershowitz, Imputed Liability for Supervising
Prosecutors: Applying the Military Doctrine of Command Responsibility to Reduce
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 395, 398 (2009); Teah R. Lupton,
Prosecutorial Discretion, 90 GEO. L.J. 1279, 1280 (2002).
21
ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 5
(2007) [hereinafter ARBITRARY JUSTICE]; see also, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and
Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 25 (1998) (arguing
that because prosecutors are the most powerful officials in the criminal justice system, they
have a responsibility to use their discretion to overcome racial disparities in prosecutions and
conviction rates); Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 393,
405, 448 (1992) (describing prosecutors’ growing power since the 1970s and arguing that
while a prosecutor has always been “one of the most powerful officials in government,” he
20
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decisions happen behind closed doors and are virtually unreviewable.22
Prosecutors are answerable only to other prosecutors, 23 who rarely
prosecute such misconduct. 24 Elected prosecutors, despite having a
responsibility to their electorates, 25 rarely face punishment at the ballot box
because the public usually does not learn of the misconduct and even if it
does, it may not care as long as convictions resulted.26
Prosecutorial discretion—deciding what legal actions to take, if
any 27—is a “residual concept” that leaves prosecutors the opportunity to
exercise subjective judgment within the gaps of statutory and judge-made
law. 28 Legal philosophers have typically not provided a more particular
definition 29 because “like the hole in a doughnut,” discretion exists in
between restrictions and “is therefore a relative concept.”30 The theoretical
base of discretion is the Anglo-American understanding of free will. 31
Since people choose whether to exercise their own power, they have
discretion to make choices about their actions. 32 Discretion is likely
inevitable due to human limitations33 and resource limitations making

has become a “pervasive and dominant force in criminal justice”).
22
DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 5.
23
Id.
24
See infra Part III.B.2.
25
STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 2, 11 (2006) (reporting that all but three states and
the District of Columbia elect their chief prosecutors); Abby L. Dennis, Comment, Reining
in the Minister of Justice: Prosecutorial Oversight and the Superseder Power, 57 DUKE L.J.
131, 138 (2007) (arguing that despite responsibility to their electorate, prosecutors are most
concerned with convictions because that is what they are ultimately judged on); cf. Sanford
C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, Citizen Oversight and the Electoral Incentives of Criminal
Prosecutors, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 334, 350 (2002) (using a computer model to suggest that the
electorate’s focus on convictions is not misplaced).
26
DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 5; see also Ken Armstrong & Maurice
Possley, Trial & Error: The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, at 1 [hereinafter
The Verdict] (cataloging former prosecutors who were promoted or elected after
demonstrated misconduct).
27
Charles Breitel, Controls in Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 427–28 (1960).
28
James Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 1976 DUKE
L.J. 651, 653.
29
Id.
30
Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Law a System of Rules?, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 25,
45 (Robert S. Summers ed., 1968) (suggesting that the meaning of “discretion” will depend
on the context of authority and legal standards).
31
See Breitel, supra note 27, at 427–28.
32
Id.
33
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 120–32 (1961) (theorizing law as a union of
primary and secondary rules, which needs to allow for discretion due to humanity’s inability
to predict all future quandaries).
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punishment of all crimes impossible. 34 The Supreme Court has endorsed
prosecutorial discretion on numerous occasions.35
Resource limitations make some discretion inevitable, but the modern
criminal justice system guarantees wide-ranging discretion. There are
likely over 4,000 federal crimes, 36 and that number is growing. 37 The state
level mirrors the federal crime increase. 38 While this means that
prosecutors face increasing trial dockets,39 there are also numerous crimes

34
Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor’s Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP.
L. 532, 533–35 (1970) (arguing that discretion also allows a prosecutor to consider the
victim’s opinions, avoid costly prosecutions, achieve other enforcement goals, and decide
when correction can be best accomplished without prosecution).
35
See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“In our criminal justice
system, the Government retains ‘broad discretion’ as to whom to prosecute.”); United States
v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n.11 (1982) (indicating that a prosecutor’s discretion in
selecting charges against an accused includes threatening additional charges if a plea
agreement is not accepted); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (“[T]he conscious
exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional
violation.”).
36
JOHN S. BAKER, JR., HERITAGE FOUND., LEGAL MEMORANDUM, REVISITING THE
EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIMES 1 (June 16, 2008), available at http://s3.
amazonaws.com/thf_media/2008/pdf/lm26.pdf; see also Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller,
Many Failed Attempts to Count Federal Criminal Laws, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2011, at A10
(reporting on numerous failed attempts to count the number of federal crimes and explaining
that past numbers have merely been estimates).
37
BAKER, supra note 36, at 1 (finding that federal crimes are growing at an “average [of]
56.5 crimes per year”); John S. Baker, Jr., Measuring the Explosive Growth of Federal
Crimes Legislation, 5 ENGAGE 23, 26 (2004), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/
20070321_oct04.pdf (discovering that over a seven-year period, Congress passed more new
criminal sections in each election year than it did during all of that period’s nonelection
sessions combined).
38
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
513–14 (2001) (finding an approximately four-fold increase in Illinois’s criminal laws; a
three-fold increase in Virginia’s laws, despite the elimination of slavery-related crimes; and
a two-and-a-half-fold increase in Massachusetts’s laws since the 1850s—increases similar to
the three-and-a-half-fold expansion in the U.S. Code’s criminal section over the same time
period).
39
State-court felony filings rose 31% from 1996 to 2005. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT, 2006, at 137–39 tbl.7
(2007) (totaling the individual state-court felony filings). This rapid increase is in accord
with Professor Stuntz’s finding of a 36% increase in state-court felony filings from 1978 to
1984 and an additional 51% increase from 1985 to 1991. William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining
and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2555 n.9 (2004); see
also Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecution in 3-D, 102 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY
1119, 1134 n.45 (2012) (reporting that a junior prosecutor “is likely to have 75–100 cases on
her desk”). But see COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS:
AN ANALYSIS OF 2009 STATE COURT CASELOADS 20 (2011) (reporting that criminal
caseloads have declined 4% since 2006—a record year for state-court criminal caseloads).
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that go unprosecuted. 40 This allows prosecutors to select the prosecutions
they pursue and those they do not. Further, directly in response to their
large dockets, prosecutors rely on plea agreements.41 In state courts, plea
agreements account for over 94% of felony convictions 42 and this rate is
even higher in federal courts. 43 These agreements also often come early in
an investigation when a prosecutor can dictate terms to a defendant before
the defendant’s attorney has had time to investigate the case. 44 No one
reviews prosecutors’ discretionary decisions to offer or not to offer such
plea agreements. 45 Taking charging and plea-bargaining powers together,
prosecutors have large discretion in determining criminal sentences. Often
the prosecutor is setting the punishment for criminal acts with a force of law
similar to that of the legislatures that write the initial law. 46
Prosecutorial discretion is reinforced by immunity from civil
lawsuits. 47 The first American case to extend immunity to a prosecutor was

40

For instance, in fiscal year 1997, three years after the passage of the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902, there had not been a single
federal prosecution based on this law. AM. BAR ASS’N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL
LAW 20 (1998). But see Letter from Caroline Frederickson, Director, ACLU, to Sen. Arlen
Specter, Chair, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (July 27, 2005), available at
http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/aclu-letter-senate-judiciary-committee-regardingviolence-against-women-act-2005-s-119 (arguing that the Violence Against Women Act
“dramatically improved the law enforcement response to violence against women” and
should be reauthorized).
41
Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
50, 51 (1968) (arguing that without plea agreements, courts would be swamped with too
many cases and too few resources).
42
SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006, at 24 (2009).
43
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY: DECEMBER 31, 2010, at 83 tbl.D-4 (reporting that in 2010, of the 89,373 federal
convictions, 87,001 (97%) were through plea agreement); see also Plea Agreements, 1A
FED. PRAC. & PROC. CRIM. § 180 (4th ed. & 2011 Supp.) (describing federal percentages that
exceed state percentages).
44
DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 44–45.
45
Stuntz, supra note 39, at 2567.
46
Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV.
1471, 1513 (1993). This “price setting” of criminal punishment even occurred despite
mandatory federal sentencing guidelines, which could have restrained such negotiations. See
generally Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nage, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal
Sentencing Guildelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta
Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1292 (1997) (arguing that federal prosecutors use tools like
“fact bargaining” to get around mandatory sentences in plea-bargaining encounters). This
power has likely grown post-United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), where the
Supreme Court struck down the mandatory nature of the sentencing guidelines.
47
Scott J. Krischke, Absent Accountability: How Prosecutorial Impunity Hinders the
Fair Administration of Justice in America, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 395, 399 (2010).
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an 1896 Indiana Supreme Court decision affirming dismissal of a complaint
for malicious prosecution. 48 This decision became the majority rule in the
United States. 49 By 1927, the Supreme Court endorsed this rule 50 by
affirming per curiam the Second Circuit’s holding that a prosecutor “is
immune from . . . malicious prosecution based on an indictment and
prosecution . . . .” 51 The Second Circuit grounded this rule in public policy
considerations. 52 In 1976, the Supreme Court extended this common law
rule of immunity to § 1983 civil rights claims. 53 This holding was limited
to the “judicial phase of the criminal process.”54
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court further extended prosecutorial
immunity. In Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 55 the Court extended absolute
immunity to administrative tasks, such as training, supervision, and
management of information systems. 56 The Court’s rationale for this
expansion was that these administrative tasks relied on the prosecutor’s
“legal knowledge and the exercise of related discretion.”57 In other
circumstances, the Court has granted qualified immunity to provide a
“defense of good faith” for prosecutors performing certain official duties. 58
These official duties include: (1) advising the police; 59 (2) interacting with
the media; 60 and (3) testifying as a complaining witness. 61 Qualified

48

Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001, 1002 (Ind. 1896) (“[I]f it be made in the due course
of a legal or judicial proceeding, it is privileged, and cannot be the foundation of an action of
defamation.”).
49
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422 (1976); see also id. at 422 n.19 (collecting state
cases from Kansas, Mississippi, North Dakota, and Oregon).
50
Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 406 (2d Cir. 1926), aff’d per curiam, 275 U.S. 503
(1927).
51
Yaselli, 12 F.2d at 406.
52
Id. (“The public interest requires that persons occupying such important positions and
so closely identified with the judicial departments of the government should speak and act
freely and fearlessly in the discharge of their important official functions. They should be no
more liable to private suits for what they say and do in the discharge of their duties than are
the judges and jurors, to say nothing of the witnesses who testify in a case.”).
53
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424.
54
Id. at 430.
55
555 U.S. 335 (2009).
56
Id. at 339.
57
Id. at 344.
58
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967); see also John D. Kirby, Qualified Immunity
for Civil Rights Violations: Refining the Standard, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 462, 470 (1990)
(explaining the development of qualified immunity for public officials under § 1983).
59
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 495 (1991).
60
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269, 278 (1993) (applying a “functional
approach” to extend absolute immunity only when a prosecutor is acting for the state at trial
or in trial preparation, but not when the prosecutor acts as any other executive official would,
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immunity will protect a prosecutor unless he or she knowingly violates
clear constitutional standards. 62
Since absolute or qualified immunity will be extended to most actions
of a prosecutor, one concern is that immunity leads to an increase in
prosecutors pursuing wrongful convictions and violating defendants’
constitutional rights. 63 Chief Judge Learned Hand worried that immunity
was a “balance between the evils” of leaving “unredressed the wrongs done
by dishonest officers” and subjecting “those who try to do their duty to the
constant dread of retaliation.” 64 In the end, Hand, like the Supreme Court,
decided that immunity reinforcing discretion was preferable to the
alternative. 65 State legislatures have embraced this common law civil
immunity through their statutes.66 In interpreting these statutes and their
common law antecedents, state courts, similar to federal courts, provide
absolute immunity to prosecutors for actions within the scope of their
duties. 67 All told, practical necessities and theoretical considerations make
prosecutors powerful actors with protected, wide-ranging discretion.

for instance in speaking at a press conference, where qualified immunity is proper).
61
Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 132–33 (1997).
62
Doe v. Phillips, 81 F.3d 1204, 1211 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Camreta v. Greene, 131 S.
Ct. 2020, 2030–31 (2011) (explaining test for government officials in a case involving child
protective services official and county sheriff); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982) (announcing this rule for government officials).
63
See generally Krischke, supra note 47, at 412–13 (linking the increased use of
prosecutorial pressure on former inmates to “snitch” on their peers with the racial disparity
of prison populations to suggest an unfair administration of justice).
64
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
65
Id.
66
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 821.6 (West 2012) (providing that a prosecutor “is not
liable for injury caused . . . within the scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously
and without probable cause”); id. § 820.2 (providing that a government official, including a
prosecutor, “is not liable for . . . the exercise of the discretion vested in him”); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 20-1-106.1(2) (West 2012) (“In the absence of the bad faith performance of the
duties specified in this section, the district attorneys of the state of Colorado shall be immune
from liability for the performance of said duties.”); GA. CONST. art. 6, § 8, ¶ 1(e)
(“District attorneys shall enjoy immunity from private suit for actions arising from the
performance of their duties.”); 42 PENN. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8546 (West 2007) (providing
defenses at the common law); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-3-208 (2012) (providing that district
attorneys “shall not be civilly or criminally liable for acts performed pursuant” to their
duties).
67
See, e.g., Falls v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908, 915 (Ct. App. 1996) (providing
absolute immunity for acts within the judicial process or associated with the judicial phase of
the criminal process); Durham v. McElynn, 772 A.2d 68, 69 (Pa. 2001) (limiting absolute
immunity to actions within scope of delegated authority).
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B. THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION
Beyond the theoretical concern of prosecutorial discretion thwarting
the rule of law68 and the intuitive fear of untrained prosecutors using
discretionary authority incorrectly, as implied in the previous section,
discretion has also been blamed in a variety of situations where prosecutors
cared more about winning a case than about justice. 69 The resulting
wrongful convictions are more prevalent than one would hope. For
instance, since the advent of DNA testing, there have been 301 exonerations
in the United States of convicted prisoners. 70 In 1999, Chicago Tribune
staff writers surveyed nationwide cases and found that 381 homicide
convictions have been overturned since 1963 because the “prosecutors
concealed evidence suggesting innocence or presented evidence they knew
to be false.” 71 In sixty-seven of the cases, the defendant had been sentenced
to death, and over half of those former death row inmates were
subsequently released. 72 The authors of the report noted that the frequency
of such withholdings is likely much higher than they found because they
only examined homicide cases. 73 A year earlier, the Pittsburgh PostGazette’s Bill Moushey reviewed over 1,500 allegations of prosecutorial
misconduct over a period of ten years and reached a similar conclusion.74
In his review, the author found “hundreds of examples of discovery
violations in which prosecutors intentionally concealed evidence that might
have helped prove a defendant innocent or a witness against him suspect.”75
The effect of such actions by prosecutors on defendants is well
In a particularly egregious example, two men were
chronicled. 76
68

See supra notes 27–34 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 4 (discussing her time at the
Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia and stating that she found that most
prosecutors saw their role as winning—i.e., getting a conviction in—every case); John
Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion—A Comment, 60 NW. U. L. REV. 174, 180–81 (1965)
(detailing a former prosecutor’s admission that win–loss record affects status within the
office). Compare these admissions with the meaning of justice: “That end which ought to be
reached in a case by the regular administration of the principles of law involved as applied to
the facts.” BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 696 (3d ed. 1969).
70
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Dec. 7, 2012).
71
Armstrong & Possley, The Verdict, supra note 26, at 1.
72
Id. Those that were not released were likely reprosecuted with this additional evidence
included in the case.
73
Id.
74
Bill Moushey, Discovery Violations Have Made Evidence-Gathering a Shell Game,
PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 24, 1998, at A-1.
75
Id.
76
See, e.g., DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 3–4, 132–34; Edward M.
69
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wrongfully accused of murdering a ten-year-old girl. 77 The main evidence
that linked the two men to the crime was a lie told by a police officer that
one of the men had a “vision” of the crime scene that only someone on hand
for the murder would have known. 78 Meanwhile, prosecutors did not
pursue leads relating to a different man who pleaded guilty to two other
murders, including that of another young female. 79 At a third trial, after
new DNA evidence surfaced excluding the accused of being the murderers,
a judge returned a verdict of not guilty. 80 The participants—three
prosecutors and four police officers—were later indicted and then acquitted
for the criminal conspiracy of creating the vision lie.81
A prosecutor’s desire to win his case, either for individual reasons or
as the result of incentive programs, may lead him to take actions that are not
within ethical or legal bounds. 82 For instance, the Denver Post reported in
2011 that a district attorney’s office offered prosecutors a monetary award,
averaging $1,100, based in part on their felony conviction rates. 83 The

Genson & Marc W. Martin, The Epidemic of Prosecutorial Courtroom Misconduct in
Illinois: Is it Time to Start Prosecuting the Prosecutors?, 19 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 39, 39–41
(1987).
77
Rolando Cruz, CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
cwc/exonerations/ilCruzSummary.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012) [hereinafter Cruz, CTR.
ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS]. See also generally THOMAS FRISBIE & RANDY GARRETT,
VICTIMS OF JUSTICE REVISITED ch. 5 (rev. ed. 2005) (reporting the detailed story of the
Rolando Cruz prosecution).
78
Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, Trial & Error: Prosecution on Trial in DuPage,
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 1999, at 1 [hereinafter Prosecution on Trial].
79
Id.
80
Cruz, CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, supra note 77.
81
Possley & Armstrong, Prosecution on Trial, supra note 78.
82
This does not mean that an incentive program could not positively reward behaviors
leading to fairness. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Holder
Recognizes DOJ Employees and Others for Their Service at Annual Awards Ceremony (Oct.
27, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/October/10-ag-1207.html
(recognizing and rewarding Department of Justice officials at annual award ceremony for
contributions to the Department). See generally Stephanos Bibas, Rewarding Prosecutors
for Performance, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 441, 442 (2009) (encouraging a pay-forperformance model centered on certain desired behaviors); Tracy L. Meares, Rewards for
Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial
Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 873–75 (1995) (proposing that prosecutors be
evaluated on whether they secured convictions or plea agreements on the same charge(s)
they brought initially to disincentivize adding charges in an effort to secure plea
agreements). Instead, this is more a statement about the types of financial programs that
have been implemented.
83
Jessica Fender, DA Chambers Offers Bonuses for Prosecutors Who Hit Conviction
Targets, DENVERPOST.COM (Apr. 11, 2011, 3:43 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/news/
ci_17686874.
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reporter noted that this was an unusual scheme as prosecutors from other
jurisdictions in the state believed that their prosecutors should be seeking
justice as an incentive in itself. 84 The district attorney even acknowledged
that there could be concerns of prosecutors “cherry-picking” easier cases to
ensure convictions. 85 But instead of ending the program, the district
attorney in charge of the office responded that the bonus was easily
attainable enough not to encourage such cherry-picking to attain the
bonus. 86 While this may be true, the potential for and, at least, the
appearance of impropriety are present.
In another particularly disturbing “incentive program” during the
1970s, Chicago prosecutors had a contest to be the first person to convict
two tons of defendants. 87 The “game” required prosecutors to literally
weigh convicted felons on a scale. 88 The winning prosecutor would be the
first person whose convicted defendants weighed a total of two tons. 89
Making the situation even harder to rationalize, the mainly white
prosecutors described their trials and “contest” in racially explicit terms.” 90
More recently, special counsel Henry Schuelke reported on the
misconduct of those within the Alaska U.S. Attorney’s Office in the
conviction of Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska on federal corruption
charges. 91 Before sentencing, the Department of Justice moved to set aside
the conviction after discovering undisclosed material information that all
agreed was required to be turned over to defense attorneys before trial. 92
Such information would have strengthened and supported Senator Stevens’s
explanation and defense of the charges in the corruption probe. 93 After an
investigation of the incident, special counsel Schuelke rejected the proffered
rationale for the mistake and concluded that the two lead prosecutors
“intentionally withheld and concealed material exculpatory information,

84

Id.
Id.
86
Id.
87
Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, Trial & Error: The Flip Side of a Fair Trial, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 11, 1999, at 1.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. (calling the courthouses where they worked “Darkham” and “Rolling Ghettos,” and
calling the contest “N[-----]s by the Pound”).
91
Report to Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan of Investigation Conducted Pursuant to the Court’s
Order, dated April 7, 2009 at 1–2, In re Special Proceedings, No. 1:09-mc-00198-EGS
(D.D.C. Nov. 14, 2011).
92
Id. at 32.
93
Id. at 38.
85
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which was required to be disclosed.” 94 Implicit in the report is the charge
that the prosecutors intentionally withheld material information out of a
desire to win—potentially for career advancement through prosecuting a
sitting U.S. Senator—and an inherent conflict of interest in reviewing what
information should be given to the other side.95
Prosecutorial discretion has led to practical problems and socially
unacceptable results. Whether caused by an individual desire to win,
incentive programs, or simply mistakes, discretion can lead to incorrect
convictions and ruined lives.
C. BASIC LIMITS ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
The legal system attempts to impose limits on discretion in response to
these unacceptable results.96 The reason for limiting discretion is to reduce
the threat to individual freedoms. 97 One of these discretion limitations is
the constitutional requirement, as developed by the Supreme Court, of
certain procedural safeguards for the accused. These safeguards reinforce
Justice Sutherland’s oft-quoted 1935 opinion in Berger v. United States that
a prosecutor’s goal “in a criminal prosecution is not that [she] shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done.” 98 In that case, the Supreme Court
reversed a conviction because the prosecutor’s misconduct had a “probable
cumulative effect upon the jury,” biasing jurors against the defendant.99
The petitioner in Berger had been indicted along with seven other
defendants in two separate criminal conspiracies to counterfeit Federal
Reserve Bank notes. 100 There was no direct evidence linking the petitioner
to one of the conspiracies; the evidence only showed him potentially
passing notes in the second conspiracy without further criminal activity. 101
However, he was convicted at a trial during which the U.S. Attorney
“overstepped the bounds of . . . propriety and fairness” by: (1) misstating
facts; (2) falsely attributing statements to witnesses; (3) suggesting out-ofcourt statements by his questions; (4) assuming prejudicial information not

94

Id. at 36.
William M. Welch & William W. Taylor, The Brady Problem: Time to Face Reality,
NAT’L L.J., July 16, 2012, at 44–46.
96
Cf. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125, 125 n.9 (1979) (stating that
prosecutor discretion cannot implicate impermissible standards like “race, religion, or other
arbitrary classification”).
97
Breitel, supra note 27, at 428.
98
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
99
Id. at 89.
100
Id. at 79–80.
101
Id. at 80.
95
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presented as evidence; and (5) bullying witnesses.102 The Court seemed
disturbed that these improprieties were used to suggest that the petitioner
was a part of both conspiracies since the evidence could only tie him to
one. 103 In concluding, Justice Sutherland wrote, “[W]hile [the prosecutor]
may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just
one.” 104
One way that the law has attempted to rein in prosecutorial discretion
is through required disclosures of certain evidence to the defense. For
instance, upon a defendant’s request, the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure require a prosecutor to provide to the defense oral or written
statements made by the defendant that the prosecutor plans to use at trial. 105
In addition, upon request, the prosecution is required to provide documents
and objects that are material to preparing a defense or will be a part of the
government’s case-in-chief, in addition to a summary of expected expert
witness testimony; the defendant’s criminal record; and reports from any
physical, mental, or scientific tests. 106
States may also require these disclosures and others from prosecutors.
For instance, Illinois requires the same disclosures upon request that the
federal rules provide. 107 In addition, the state requires disclosure if a
defendant requests information about anticipated witnesses, including any
prior criminal record(s); statements by codefendants; and portions of grand
jury hearing transcripts. 108 The state also requires disclosure, with or
without a request, of electronic surveillance the state conducted on the
defendant and any material evidence that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused. 109 The prosecution must also provide to the defendant reports of
any DNA evidence at issue in the trial.110 Similarly, other states, such as

102

Id. at 84.
See id. at 81.
104
Id. at 88.
105
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A), (B).
106
Id. at 16(a)(1)(D)–(G); see also Terence F. MacCarthy & Rosalie Lindsay Guimarães,
Pretrial Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, in FEDERAL CRIMINAL PRACTICE ch. 7 (2011)
(explaining the federal rules for practicing attorneys).
107
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 412(a)(ii), (iv), (v), (vi).
108
Id. at (a)(i)–(vi).
109
Id. at (b)–(c).
110
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 417. For a fuller explanation of the Illinois state rules, see Leonard
C. Goodman, Illinois Criminal Pretrial Discovery, in DEFENDING ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CASES,
at ch. 4 (Thomas A. Lilien ed., 2010).
103
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Maryland 111 and Arizona, 112 provide in their criminal procedure rules for
mandatory material evidence disclosures without request and additional
items upon the defense’s request. Each of these codes attempts to provide
information necessary to give the defense a fair trial.
Federal and state procedural codes are just one way of regulating
discretion. Courts have also added their own requirements on prosecutors.
One such regulation is the Brady doctrine described in the next part.
D. BRADY AND ITS PROGENY REQUIRE DISCLOSURE OF
MATERIAL EVIDENCE
The Supreme Court held in the seminal Brady v. Maryland case that
“suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or
to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.” 113 In the case, John Brady and Charles Boblit planned to rob
a man for his car and his money. 114 At gunpoint, Brady and Boblit drove
the victim to a nearby forest where they strangled him to death.115 A jury
convicted John Brady of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death,
while in a separate trial, Boblit was also convicted and sentenced to
death. 116 Maryland prosecutors tried Brady first; he admitted participating
in the robbery leading to the murder, but claimed that Boblit “did the actual
killing.” 117
At trial, Brady’s attorneys conceded that he was guilty of first-degree
murder through the felony-murder rule but asked the jury to sentence him
“without capital punishment” due to Brady’s claim that he did not actually
kill the victim. 118 Unfortunately, the prosecution did not provide the
defendant access, despite requests, to all of Boblit’s extrajudicial
statements. 119 One of those statements contained his admission to being the
killer. 120 On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed Brady’s

111

MD. R. 4-262(d).
ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.1; see also C.P. Jhong, Annotation, Right of Accused in State
Courts to Inspection or Disclosure of Evidence in Possession of Prosecution, 7 A.L.R.3d 8
(1966) (reporting on various state disclosure laws).
113
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
114
Brady v. State, 154 A.2d 434, 434 (Md. 1959).
115
Id.
116
Brady, 373 U.S. at 84.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
112
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conviction but remanded the sentencing phase of the trial to allow Brady to
use Boblit’s statement because of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.121
The Supreme Court affirmed, 122 acknowledging the Maryland Court of
Appeals’ conclusion that the excluded statement could not reduce Brady’s
conviction below first-degree murder and thus left the state law ruling
untouched. 123 In doing so, however, the Court for the first time ruled that a
defendant was entitled to all “evidence favorable to an accused upon
request” 124 under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 125
After Brady and the requirement of disclosure upon request of material
evidence, the Court heard a number of cases on the meaning and reach of
the Brady doctrine. Potentially most importantly, after a nine-year
detour, 126 the Court held that “material” evidence must be made available to
the accused with or without request. 127 In United States v. Bagley, after the
defense made a general request for information, evidence that could have
impeached the prosecution’s key witnesses—namely that the witnesses had
been paid $300 to testify—was not provided. 128 After the defense
discovered this information through a Freedom of Information Act request,
the defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the disclosure of this
impeachable evidence would have changed the result of his trial and the
failure to disclose denied him the due process rights guaranteed by
Brady. 129 The district court disagreed 130 but the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed, suggesting that by not providing information for
cross-examination, the prosecutor violated the defendant’s right to a fair

121

Id. at 85.
Id. at 91.
123
Id. at 90.
124
Id. at 87. The importance of the word “requested” was underscored in later decisions
of the Court. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“In Brady the request
was specific . . . [giving] the prosecutor notice of exactly what the defense desired.”); Moore
v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794–95 (1972) (“Important, then, are (a) suppression by the
prosecution after a request by the defense, (b) the evidence’s favorable character for the
defense, and (c) the materiality of the evidence.”); see also BENNETT L. GERSHMAN,
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 5:2, at 220 (2d ed. 2011) (explaining that it was these
subsequent cases that clarified Brady’s focus on specific requests for favorable material
evidence).
125
U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
126
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103–07 (defining three different categories of disclosure
information dependent on whether the accused requested the information and fashioning a
test for each category).
127
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 672 (1985).
128
Id. at 671.
129
Id. at 671–72.
130
Id. at 673.
122
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trial. 131
The Court rejected this “automatic reversal” and remanded the case. 132
Instead of the Ninth Circuit’s test or a previous Court test based on the
general request, the undisclosed impeachment evidence should have been
analyzed under the Brady materiality standard regardless of whether or how
it was requested. 133 Under this standard, an appeals court must reverse a
conviction “only if the evidence is material in the sense that its suppression
undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.”134 The standard for
making this determination in all Brady reviews is a fact-intensive inquiry on
the “reasonable probability” that the trial was fair without this evidence
being shared with the defendant. 135 On remand, the Ninth Circuit again
reversed and vacated Bagley’s conviction.136
Since Bagley, U.S. courts have continued to struggle with Brady
determinations. For instance, some courts continue to distinguish between
circumstances where the defendant requested material information and
those where he did not. 137 Subsequent case law revealed that the lower
courts’ question with respect to undisclosed evidence is “whether in its
absence[,] [the defendant] received a fair trial, understood as a trial
resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” 138 The Court went on to
redefine this as “[a] ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result” when “the
government’s evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confidence in the
outcome of the trial.’”139 It is not surprising with such a subjective test that
further analysis and exposition by the Supreme Court, lower federal courts,
and state courts have been necessary.

131

See Bagley v. Lumpkin, 719 F.2d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983), rev’d sub nom. United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
132
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 674.
133
Id. at 676.
134
Id. at 678.
135
Id. at 684; id. at 685 (White, J., concurring).
136
Bagley v. Lumpkin, 798 F.2d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1986).
137
See, e.g., Johnson v. Gibson, 169 F.3d 1239, 1254–55 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[A] request
for specific information, as opposed to a general request . . . can lower the threshold of
materiality necessary to establish a violation.”); United States v. Vozzella, 124 F.3d 389, 392
(2d Cir. 1997) (utilizing the Agurs three-level analysis); Smith v. Sec’y of N.M. Dep’t. of
Corr., 50 F.3d 801, 826 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that it is “more prudent for defense counsel
to at least make a ‘general request’ for Brady material” than not to make any request);
United States v. Joseph, 996 F.2d 36, 40 (3d Cir. 1993) (distinguishing a case with a specific
request from a case where there was a general request); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-311(b) (1993) (prosecutor should make a “reasonably diligent effort to
comply with a legally proper discovery request”).
138
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).
139
Id. (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678).
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A study of federal post-Brady reversals involving undisclosed
evidence reveals some trends. 140 For instance, exculpating evidence is
more likely to be material than impeachment evidence 141 and repetitive or
cumulative information is ordinarily not material. 142 However, the inquiry
remains fact-intensive; if the prosecution’s case is filled with “gaps,” 143
includes “weaknesses and uncertainties,” 144 “suggestive of . . . another
perpetrator,” 145 or is otherwise “tenuous,” 146 the evidence withheld is more
likely to be material.
Post-Brady and Bagley, courts engage in a post hoc analysis of
whether undisclosed evidence was material; the task for a prosecutor is
much more difficult—an ex ante pretrial consideration of whether a piece of
information will interact with potential trial evidence to the point where it
will impact the case’s outcome. 147 As a prosecutor is not under an
obligation to disclose the entire investigative file,148 the modern prosecutor
must struggle with this Brady analysis. The test is fact-specific and is
therefore inexact and complex, and it requires much training and
understanding on the part of a prosecutor.149 But the obligation is also
counter to a prosecutor’s natural inclination. The obligation asks
prosecutors to stand in defense counsel’s shoes, consider what information
they would want, and then “reveal information that makes conviction less
likely.” 150
Under Justice Thomas’s view, this complicated test works because
prosecutors have “professional training and ethical obligations.” 151
Unfortunately, as outlined in the next section and as Justice Ginsburg

140

Jason B. Binimow, Annotation, Constitutional Duty of Federal Prosecutor to
Disclose Brady Evidence Favorable to Accused, 158 A.L.R. FED. 401 (1999 & Westlaw
Supp. 2011).
141
See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 164, 171 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Boyette v.
Lefevre, 246 F.3d 76, 92 (2d Cir. 2001).
142
See, e.g., Simental v. Matrisciano, 363 F.3d 607, 611 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Imbruglia, 617 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1980).
143
United States v. Sheehan, 442 F. Supp. 1003, 1009 (D. Mass. 1977).
144
State v. Falkins, 356 So. 2d 415, 419 (La. 1978).
145
Scurr v. Niccum, 620 F.2d 186, 191 (8th Cir. 1980); see also State v. Spurlock, 874
S.W.2d 602, 616–17 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (holding that the prosecutor needed to turn
over audio recordings implicating another person as the criminal actor).
146
Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286, 312 (4th Cir. 2003).
147
Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 2092 (2010).
148
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976).
149
Barkow, supra note 147, at 2097–98.
150
Welch & Taylor, supra note 95, at 45.
151
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1363 (2011).
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feared, this training is simply inadequate, calling into question whether the
Brady doctrine delivers on its due process guarantees and how it impacts
the lives of criminal defendants.
III. POLICY PROPOSALS TO END PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT FAIL BY
NOT ADDRESSING PROSECUTORIAL TRAINING
A. PROSECUTORS LACK APPROPRIATE TRAINING
Despite a prosecutor’s power and discretion, the only legal
requirement for becoming a prosecutor is often no more than admission to
the state’s bar.152 The National District Attorneys Association’s suggestion
is to require that “a prosecutor . . . be a member in good standing of the
state’s bar, except as otherwise provided by law.” 153 This suggestion
applies for prosecutors that are elected, appointed, or hired. 154 For the most
part, states have not added additional requirements for hired prosecutors.155
However, some states add additional requirements for those who are in
leadership positions or are elected. 156 Most often, this simply is a
requirement that the individual is a resident within the office’s jurisdiction,
rather than that the individual meets any training or skill requirements. 157
The reason for this location requirement for lead prosecutors, even if not
elected, is a preference that they be available to interact with the
represented community, including local police and judicial officials, and be

152

Admittedly, individual offices may have higher standards for hiring an attorney.
NAT’L DISTRICT ATT’YS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1-4.1 (3d ed.
2009) [hereinafter NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS].
154
Id.
155
See, e.g., MICH. OP. ATT’Y GEN. No. 803 (1948), at 740 (requiring that individual be
admitted to the bar to be qualified to be a prosecutor) (citing People ex rel. Hughes v. May, 3
Mich. 598 (1855)); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 56.010–20 (West 1998) (adding only requirement to
be twenty-one years old); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41:10-a (LexisNexis 2009) (appointing
municipal prosecutors who must be “members of the New Hampshire bar” and “serve at the
pleasure of the appointing authority”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 309.02 (West 2005)
(providing that the only requirement is being licensed to practice law).
156
See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. V, § 26(a) (1974) (requiring practice in state for five years
preceding election); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158-1 (West 2011) (head county prosecutor must
have been in practice in the state for at least five years).
157
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 31-2601 (West 2006) (stating that elected prosecutor
must live in the county he or she will serve); LA. CONST. art. V, § 26(a) (1974) (requiring
two years residence in the county that the prosecutor will represent); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 56.010 (adding a requirement to be a resident of the county for twelve months prior to an
election); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.27.010 (West 2003) (requiring elected prosecutor to
be a qualified elector of the county of the election). See also NATIONAL PROSECUTION
STANDARDS, supra note 153, at § 1-4.1.
153
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available in the case of an emergency. 158 In addition, many states also add
that a prosecutor cannot hold another office while in the role.159 For the
most part then, America’s prosecutors only need to be qualified to practice
in their respective states, which will usually entail graduating from law
school and passing the bar, 160 as Justice Thomas felt was adequate. 161
To understand if these state requirements actually prepare prosecutors
for practice, I reviewed the listed curriculums of the 202 law schools
accredited by the American Bar Association (ABA). The study found that
all schools offer courses in general criminal law and criminal procedure. 163
In addition, all but six law schools require criminal law as part of the
school’s graduation requirements. 164 On the other hand, only 53 ABAaccredited schools, or just over a quarter of all accredited schools, require a
criminal procedure course to earn a degree.165 Figure 1, infra, illustrates
that the more recent a school’s ABA accreditation, the more likely it is to
require criminal procedure. 166 Yet even with this trend, most schools do not

158

NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 153, at § 1-4 cmt.
See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. V, § 26(c) (1974) (prohibiting criminal defense work during
time in office); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 31-2601 (West 2011) (stating that no other office may
be held); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-61 (2011) (stating that a prosecutor “shall not engage
in the private practice of law”).
160
But see STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE CODE OF JUSTICE § 1-502 (1986) (amended
1991) (requiring age, high moral character, non-felon, physical ability to carry out the role,
and no dishonorable discharges from the military, in addition to bar admission and
graduation from an accredited law school).
161
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1363 (2011) (“Prosecutors not only are
equipped but are ethically bound to know what Brady entails and to perform legal research
when they are uncertain.”).
163
Note that not all law schools name their courses in the same way—some judgment
calls had to be made. However, it was typically clear from course descriptions that a course
in “Criminal Justice” dealing with the common law antecedents of the Model Penal Code
was equivalent to a course in criminal law. Similarly, criminal procedure is a diverse topic
that could encompass the federal rules of criminal procedure or the constitutional doctrines
at work in criminal processes. Since, depending on the professor and the case book,
discovery doctrines can be discussed in both, this analysis considered courses ranging from
“Constitutional Criminal Procedure” to “Criminal Adjudication” to “Criminal Practice” as
being under the heading of criminal procedure.
164
The six schools without criminal law as a required course are: Creighton University
School of Law, Lewis and Clark College Law School, the University of Arizona James E.
Rogers College of Law, University of Miami School of Law, University of New Hampshire
School of Law, and William Mitchell College of Law. See infra Appendix.
165
See infra Appendix.
166
A similar trend exists when you compare the law schools classified as tier one by U.S.
News & World Report (only three out of fifty-three require criminal procedure) with those
classified as tier four (twenty-four of the forty-five require criminal procedure). If these
schools are also producing the most prosecutors, this trend may assist in training future
159
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require criminal procedure to graduate. That said, a number of schools list
the course as being a “preference course,” 167 a course to prepare for the bar
examination,168 one “[a]ll law students should take,” 169 or one of only a
couple first-year electives.170
Figure 1
Does a Law School Require Criminal Procedure?
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However, even if a law school requires criminal procedure, a law
student may not learn about the Brady doctrine or the constitutional
requirement to turn over material evidence. Different casebooks provide
different pedagogical views171 and may only peripherally reference Brady v.

prosecutors.
167
See, e.g., NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY, SHEPARD BROAD LAW CENTER,
http://nsulaw.nova.edu/students/course-descriptions.cfm (last visited Nov. 18, 2012)
(including Criminal Procedure in a menu of three courses from which students must select
two).
168
See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.sandiego.edu/law/
academics/jd/curriculum/graduation_requirements.php (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
169
See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, GOULD SCHOOL OF LAW, http://law
web.usc.edu/why/academics/curriculum/upperDivision.cfm (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
170
See, e.g., VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.law.villanova.edu/
Academics/Degree Programs/JD/First Year.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
171
Compare ARNOLD H. LOEWY, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
QUESTIONS (3d ed. 2010) (containing thirty-two short chapters on topics ranging from
sentencing questions to Miranda warnings to probable cause searches without a higher level
organizational framework), with RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE FOURTH, FIFTH, AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS AND
RELATED AREAS (3d ed. 1995) (organizing material into three larger topic areas: an
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Maryland. 172 Nor do all bar exams ensure that such information is
understood before admission to the bar.173 Therefore, there can be no
guarantee that new prosecutors either understand or have studied important
procedural doctrines, such as Brady.
Students leaving law schools without proper knowledge is not a
problem unique to prosecutors’ offices. 174 However, unlike a law firm that
could simply reduce attorneys’ starting salaries to pay for training, most
prosecutors’ offices are small and do not provide large salaries to reduce. 175
introduction to the criminal process, the right to counsel, and the right to be left alone).
172
See, e.g., ALLEN ET AL., supra note 171, at 96–97 (citing Brady in an edited version of
a different case); ANDREW E. TASLITZ, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 771 (3d ed.
2007) (referencing Brady in a footnote as support for statement that “prosecutors are
constitutionally obliged to turn over to the defense . . . all material, exculpatory evidence”);
WELSH S. WHITE & JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION AND PROOF 706 (4th ed. 2001) (citing Brady to indicate
the “ethical responsibility of the prosecutor” in an edited version of a case on right to
counsel). But see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 621–
22 (2008) (containing an edited version of Brady in a section entitled “Constitutional
Discovery: A One-Way Street”).
173
For instance, the Louisiana bar examination does not require knowledge of Brady to
pass the criminal procedure or criminal law section of the bar, since such questions make up
less than 10% of the points allocated on those sections from 1980 to 2010. Connick v.
Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1385–86 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting one would
not even need to pass those two sections to pass the exam). This continues. No questions on
Brady were asked on the 2011 written exam. See Louisiana State Bar Exam, LA. SUPREME
CT. COMMITTEE B. ADMISSIONS (July 25, 2011), http://www.lascba.org/exams/Questions
July2011.pdf. More broadly applicable, the National Conference of Bar Examiners, which
develops the Multistate Bar Exam given in forty-eight states, does not include Brady or
disclosure obligations in its list of covered topics for the criminal procedure section of the
test. See Subject Matter Outlines, NAT’L CONF. B. EXAMINERS, http://www.ncbex.org/assets/
media_files/Information-Booklets/SMOs-from-MBEIB2012.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
174
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, In Memoriam: Bernard D. Meltzer (1914–2007), 74 U.
CHI. L. REV. 435, 435, 437–38 (2007) (arguing that since the 1960s, law schools have moved
from a focus on the profession to a focus on academic debate and this may diminish the
preparation law schools provide to students); Ashby Jones & Joseph Palazzolo, What’s a
First-Year Lawyer Worth?—Not Much, Say a Growing Number of Corporate Clients Who
Refuse to Pay, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2011, at B1 (reporting that “more than 20% of . . . inhouse legal departments . . . are refusing to pay for the work of first- or second-year
attorneys, in at least some matters”); David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students:
Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at A1 (indicating that law school graduates are not
trained in the basic legal issues they will be working on in law firms and that many law firm
clients refused to pay hourly rates of first- and second-year associates). But see Aaron N.
Taylor, Why Law School is Still Worth It, NAT’L JURIST, Nov. 2011, at 4 (arguing that law
school is still worth the expense and prepares law students for a financially lucrative career);
Michelle Weyenberg, Practice Ready, NAT’L JURIST, Oct. 2011, at 16 (reporting that a
number of law schools are changing how they teach to ensure law graduates are “practiceready for the real world”).
175
The average prosecutor’s office in the United States, including part-time offices with
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The financial resources of these offices are not usually high, and are
certainly less than even those of small private law firms. 176 Complicating
matters, prosecutors’ offices face both high turnover and recruitment
troubles. 177 Taken together, these factors place greater import on the
incomplete knowledge of recent law school graduates and other new
prosecutor hires. Unfortunately, despite the need for formal training, most
training for new prosecutors is “training by fire.” 178
The National District Attorneys Association (NDAA) has long advised
the creation of training programs: “[P]rosecutors should participate in
formal training and education programs [and] . . . should seek out
continuing legal education opportunities that focus specifically on the

a part-time chief prosecutor, has 9 staff members (both attorneys and support staff) and a
median salary of $85,000. PERRY, supra note 25, at 3. However, even large offices serving
municipalities of over 1 million people have a median salary for the chief prosecutor of only
$149,000, comparable to the starting salaries at many large law firms. Id. These numbers
have stayed consistent over the last decade, CAROL J. DEFRANCES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2001, at 2–3 (2002)
(reporting an average office size of nine staff members with an $85,000 median salary for
the chief prosecutor), but have grown since the mid-1990s, CAROL J. DEFRANCES & GREG W.
STEADMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE
COURTS, 1996, at 1 (1998) (reporting the same average office size in 1996 but with a $64,000
median salary for the chief prosecutor).
176
The median annual budget for prosecutors’ offices in this country is $355,000.
PERRY, supra note 25, at 1. This amount is roughly equivalent to the average revenue per
lawyer in 2009 at small private law firms with between two and eight attorneys, which
would indicate that even these small firms have significantly more resources at their disposal
than the average prosecutor’s office in this country. The Survey of Law Firm Economics:
How Small and Midsize Firms Weathered the Storm, NAT’L L.J. (Aug. 30, 2010),
http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/SLFE_graphics.pdf (reporting that the average revenue per
partner at these small firms was $350,000).
177
PERRY, supra note 25, at 3 (reporting that 24% of offices had problems recruiting new
staff, while 35% of offices had problems retaining staff); see also Armstrong & Possley, The
Verdict, supra note 26, at 1 (noting that Orleans Parish District Attorney Harry Connick Sr.
has a staff of 80 prosecutors, 30 of whom are new every year). But see DEFRANCES, supra
note 175, at 1 (comparing favorably the number of full-time chief prosecutors in 2001 when
over three-fourths of all chief prosecutors were full-time, to 1990 when about half of chief
prosecutors were full-time).
178
Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of
Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 569 (1999). This mentor–mentee training
may indeed be worse than formal training if young prosecutors are learning from those who
have committed Brady violations for competitive advantage in the past and are unrepentant.
For instance, would informal training from the prosecutors participating in the two-ton
conviction “game” be good? See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text. Professors
Levine and Wright’s qualitiative study published earlier in this Issue reinforces the
importance prosecutors place on mentorship. Levine & Wright, supra note 39, at 1163
(reporting that one prosecutor said about a mentor “that’s where my training came from”).
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prosecution function.” 179 Other national organizations have also assisted in
sharing training best practices since at least the 1970s. 180 For example, the
ABA has recommended that “[t]raining programs should be established . . .
for new personnel and for continuing education of the staff.” 181 Yet, it does
not appear that these suggestions have been implemented across the nation.
In fact, young prosecutors—faced with heavy caseloads, lower pay than
other attorneys, and long hours—often do not have the time to reflect or
learn from their on-the-job training. 182
Similarly, both the NDAA and the ABA suggest offices provide
prosecutors with handbooks and manuals to assist the offices’ work and
“guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.” 183 Apart from the
Department of Justice, which produces the United States Attorneys’
Manual, 184 there is little evidence that many state or local prosecutors’
offices develop these manuals.185 In the end, many new prosecutors, as
Justice Ginsburg fears, are simply not receiving the training—either in law
school or in their new positions—necessary to follow complex criminal
procedures such as the Brady doctrine.
B. PROPOSALS TO OVERCOME MISCONDUCT HAVE NOT
INCREASED TRAINING
Legal scholars, perceiving the situations outlined earlier in this
Comment, have sought ways to reduce the number of prosecutorial
misconduct issues that accused defendants face. These proposed solutions

179

NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 153, § 1-5.3.
See generally NAT’L ASS’N ATT’YS GEN., COMM. OFFICE ATT’Y GEN., PROSECUTOR
TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS (1972); NAT’L ASS’N ATT’YS GEN., COMM. OFFICE
ATT’Y GEN., TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR LOCAL PROSECUTORS (1978).
181
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 32.6 (1993) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE].
182
Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 498 (2009);
Levenson, supra note 178.
183
NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 153, § 1-5.4; see also ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 181, Standard 3-2.5 (recommending that the
guide be public except for “confidential” matters).
184
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL (1997 & amdts.),
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/ [hereinafter
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL].
185
See Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful
Convictions: Shaping Remedies for A Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 422 n.123
(reporting that in thirty years of practice the author had not seen a published manual or
guideline in several cities and counties throughout two states). But see Levine & Wright,
supra note 39, at 1150 (reporting that one of the three surveyed prosecutorial offices had a
“forty-page manual”).
180
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have implicated all three branches of government, indicating that the
failures are not attributable to a single government branch’s lack of political
will. However, the proposals have failed because they have not overcome
(or even addressed) the fact that prosecutors are not getting the training they
need.
1. Proposed Legislative Solutions: Civil Liability Against the Government
State legislatures have sought to grant innocent people an avenue for
redress for the damages caused by their wrongful convictions through either
civil actions or cash payments. 186 This can be an appropriate way to
provide some compensation for the wrongfully convicted since, as outlined
supra Part II.A, individual prosecutors are immune from civil liability.
Responding to advocates, at least half of all U.S. states 187 and the District
of Columbia 188 have added a statutory scheme to provide some
remuneration for those wrongfully incarcerated. State schemes typically
either pay a set amount for the time spent incarcerated, 189 pay a restitution
amount for lost wages, 190 create a state board to set an individual’s

186

See, e.g., N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(1) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2012).
Compensation
for
the
Wrongly
Convicted,
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/Compensation.php (last visited Mar. 8, 2012)
(advocating for $50,000 per year of wrongful incarceration to fulfill the moral and legal
obligation to those exonerated). The Innocence Project notes that while twenty-seven states
and the District of Columbia have passed laws allowing some form of compensation for the
wrongly accused, not all of these states provide financial compensation. Id. Instead, some
only provide modest training programs. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214 (2011)
(providing educational training for those exonerated by postconviction DNA testing).
188
Those that were either unjustly convicted, pardoned for innocence, or incarcerated for
longer than their maximum term can bring a claim against the city government. D.C. CODE
§ 2-421 to -423 (LexisNexis 2001).
189
Amounts range across states from $50 per day to $50,000 per year. For example,
Missouri provides $50 per day in restitution but only to those found innocent by a
postconviction DNA trial. MO. ANN. STAT. § 650.058 (West 2006 & Supp. 2012). On the
other end of the spectrum, Alabama provides $50,000 per year of incarceration, for someone
convicted of a state felony or incarcerated pretrial for at least two years without individual
fault for the conviction. ALA. CODE § 29-2-156, -159 (LexisNexis 2003). Most states are
between these two amounts. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8 (2012) (providing
$25,000 per year, up to a total of $250,000, for an incarcerated individual who can prove he
is “factually innocent of the crime”).
190
These payments can either be based on the individual’s past income or based on an
average wage in the state. For example, New Jersey provides an individualized assessment
paying the greater of $20,000 or double the person’s annual income, plus reasonable
attorney’s fees for those who “did not commit” the crime. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-2, -5
(West 2009). On the other hand, Utah provides wrongfully convicted persons the monetary
equivalent of the average annual nonagricultural payroll wage in the state for up to 15 years.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-405 (LexisNexis 2008).
187
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particular compensation based on his time incarcerated, 191 allow for a civil
action, 192 or, in the case of Texas, use a combination of schemes. 193 States
often condition such schemes on whether a person can prove her own
innocence. 194 The federal government, too, provides a claim for a
maximum of $50,000 per year of wrongful imprisonment. 195
To the extent that these laws and tort actions are intended to go beyond
repayment and disincentivize prosecutors from pursuing actions that lead to
wrongful convictions by forcing a negative externality onto the
government, 196 they have failed. 197 The payments do not come from local

191
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 4900 (West 2011) (providing means for innocent or
pardoned incarcerated individuals to make a claim to the California Victim Compensation
and Government Claims Board for payment); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 775.05 (West 2009)
(providing up to $25,000 in total equitable relief with a rate of compensation of $5,000 per
year of imprisonment to individuals who successfully petition the Claims Board by
demonstrating innocence).
192
For instance, New York provides a wrongfully convicted person the right to bring a
civil lawsuit within two years of a pardon or dismissal. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(7)
(McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2012). The court is to provide the sum of money that the court
determines is fair and reasonable to compensate someone who (1) was pardoned or whose
conviction was reversed or vacated, and (2) can prove that she did not commit the actions
charged and her conduct did not bring about those actions. Id. § 8-b. This scheme has been
influential in other states. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a (LexisNexis 2009) (mirroring
New York’s wrongful conviction statute, N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b). Most states with a civil
cause of action provide a cap on damages. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8242
(2003) (limiting damages to $300,000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(E) (West 2006)
(limiting damages to $40,330 for each year in prison pro rata).
193
Texas provides either an administrative procedure, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 103.051 (West 2011), or suit, id. § 103.001, but not both. In either process, the
statute requires a showing of innocence that led to a pardon or other judicial relief. Id.
§ 103.001(a).
194
See supra notes 189–193 (reporting a number of states’ innocence requirements); see
also e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102 (West 2009) (requiring a person demonstrate
release from jail on the “grounds of innocence” in a claim to the Claims Commissioner); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8 (2012) (requiring petitioner to prove that he is “factually
innocent of the crime” of which he was convicted); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258D, §§ 1, 5
(LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2012) (requiring an “erroneous felony conviction” demonstrated
by (1) a governor’s pardon expressing belief in the individual’s innocence or (2) judicial
relief granted to indicate that the person was not guilty); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-44-7 (West
2012) (requiring actual innocence and that the wrongfully convicted individual did not
perjure himself or fabricate evidence to bring about conviction). But see IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 663A.1(1)(d) (West 1998) (conditioning restitutionary claims on whether a felony
conviction was “vacated or dismissed, or . . . reversed”).
195
28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(1), (e) (2006) (increasing maximum to $100,000 per year when
“unjustly sentenced to death”).
196
Adam I. Kaplan, The Case for Comparative Fault in Compensating the Wrongfully
Convicted, 56 UCLA L. REV. 227, 241 (2008).
197
See generally Deborah Mostaghel, Wrongfully Incarcerated, Randomly
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prosecutors’ offices. Indeed, the state funds come from a state-wide fund
and do not influence the local electorate selecting the district attorney.
More likely, these laws provide small compensation for those whom the
state agrees have been wronged—a worthy goal but not something that
reduces abuses of discretion or the causes of the incarceration in the first
place, as proper training might.
Pre-Connick, lower courts entertained § 1983 suits against
municipalities for failing to train prosecutors in an effort to create
incentives by imposing civil liability on prosecutors’ offices. 198 However,
as discussed in the Introduction, last Term the Supreme Court made it
unlikely that such a theory can be used successfully in the future.199 Civil
liability is simply not a viable route to incentivize prosecutors to get proper
training.
2. Proposed Executive Solutions: Criminal Liability for Prosecutors
Another proposal for realigning prosecutor incentives has been the
criminal prosecution of prosecutors who intentionally withhold material
evidence.200 However, there is no indication that this type of liability for
prosecutors is a likely source of success, either. After all, to seek criminal
punishment against a prosecutor, another prosecutor, likely in the same
office, will have to bring charges. Intuitively, that seems unlikely, or at
least a potential conflict of interest. History has shown this premise to be
true. For instance, in the 1999 Chicago Tribune study previously
mentioned, six prosecutors were charged during the twentieth century. 201

Compensated—How to Fund Wrongful-Conviction Compensation Statutes, 44 IND. L. REV.
503, 505–09 (2011) (suggesting that it is easy to be convicted but much more difficult to be
exonerated). But see Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful
Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 101 (arguing that governments care about the trust of
their communities and these laws help to grade that trust).
198
See Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 1992); see also City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392–93 (1989) (vacating and remanding to allow the
appellant to make a failure-to-train claim for police department misconduct); Myriam E.
Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in Section 1983 Municipal
Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 41 (2000) (applying failure-to-train theory more broadly).
199
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1356 (2011) (holding that a prosecutor’s
office was not liable in a failure-to-train § 1983 suit when there was only a single Brady
violation by a single staff member, despite evidence that this was a widespread problem).
200
See, e.g., Genson & Martin, supra note 76, at 57; Krischke, supra note 47, at 434.
These proposals would not necessarily require new laws; purposeful withholdings could
meet state standards of fraud. There is also at least one federal criminal statute that could
apply. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2006) (prohibiting a person from depriving citizens of their
constitutional rights under color of law).
201
Possley & Armstrong, Prosecution on Trial, supra note 78, at 1.
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Of those, two were acquitted, two had their charges dropped before trial,
and only two were convicted—of misdemeanors with fines of $500 each. 202
Meanwhile, the DuPage County, Illinois case referenced supra Part
II.B, where the prosecutors made up evidence in an effort to convict two
innocent men of killing a ten-year-old girl, led to a jury acquittal of the
prosecutor and police defendants. 203 Showing how difficult it is to
prosecute a prosecutor, some jurors were seen celebrating after the verdict
was announced with the accused prosecutors and police officers at a local
steakhouse. 204
The results in DuPage County are not surprising. More than one
prosecutor has expressed the feeling that, “[w]e don’t ask people to
investigate their own family and prosecutors are like family.” 205 So while
prosecutors try to keep the “greater good . . . in mind . . . [, p]rosecutors just
don’t prosecute prosecutors.” 206 Further, these same prosecutors, found by
judges to have violated defendants’ rights, were often later rewarded with
promotions or judicial appointments despite their misconduct.207 All told,
while many professions have successful self-regulation mechanisms,
prosecutors have not implemented any proposals that could effectively
check their own members. 208
3. Proposed Judicial Solutions: Bar Disciplinary Actions
or Judicial Pressure
State bar agencies’ disciplinary action has also been suggested as an

202

Id.
FRISBIE & GARRETT, supra note 77.
204
Alden Long, Illinois Prosecutors and Police Acquitted Despite Evidence They
Framed Defendant, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE (June 16, 1999), http://www.wsws.org/
articles/1999/jun1999/dupa-j16.shtml.
205
Possley & Armstrong, Prosecution on Trial, supra note 78.
206
Id.
207
See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: Break Rules, Be Promoted,
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1999, at 1 [hereinafter Break Rules] (chronicling numerous Chicago-area
prosecutors’ subsequent career advancements after acknowledged misconduct).
208
See, e.g., Corn & Gershowitz, supra note 20, at 421 (advocating for a military
command structure within prosecutors’ offices to deal with discretion in the chain of
command); Bruce A. Green, Beyond Training Prosecutors About Their Disclosure
Obligations: Can Prosecutors’ Offices Learn from their Lawyers’ Mistakes?, 31 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2161, 2710 (2010) (advocating for the medical industry’s checklisting approach to find
errors); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 177–80
(2008) (promoting increased transparency and reporting). Each of these proposals would
require prosecutors to report on each other. In the end, to reduce violations, prosecutors will
have to desire that result.
203
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effective tool to reduce prosecutorial misconduct. 209 These proposals build
on the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which require a
lawyer to accept the disciplinary authority of the jurisdiction of his or her
bar admission. 210 The state bar office has the authority to discipline
prosecutors who violate discovery rules or other ethical obligations. The
state bar could also pass additional requirements and rules regulating local
prosecutors. The bar office standards that apply to prosecutors are already
written 211 and are therefore theoretically enforceable.
The evidence suggests that this is merely theoretical or potential, as
ethics rules are not being enforced in any systematic way. A 1980 to 1986
study found that of forty-one state bar disciplinary agencies that responded,
thirty-five states reported that no Brady-type complaints were filed during
that period. 212 In the ten years following this study, another commentator
found only seven new cases seeking discipline for Brady violations. 213 The
results from these seven cases were as follows: one charge dismissed, two
charges not proven, one private reprimand, one public reprimand, one
suspension of three months, and one suspension of six months. 214 A 1999
Chicago Tribune study found similarly ineffective disciplinary treatment—
in 381 homicide cases where there was prosecutorial misconduct, there was
not a single state bar action against a prosecutor.215 However, a recent
review of disciplinary action for Brady-type prosecutorial misconduct
suggests that state bar agencies may be taking these issues more seriously.
For example, in one case, a prosecutor received a five-year probation and a
four-year suspension from practice. 216

209

Kelly Gier, Prosecuting Injustice: Consequences of Misconduct, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L.
191, 205 (2006); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful
Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1, 11–
13 (2009).
210
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(a) (2011).
211
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c)–(d) (2011) (“It is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to: [(1)] engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation; [or (2)] engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.”).
212
Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations:
A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 730–31 (1987).
213
Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the
Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833, 881–
82 (1997).
214
Id. at 882.
215
Armstrong & Possley, The Verdict, supra note 26.
216
Brentford J. Ferreria, Ethical Considerations in Discovery, in DOING JUSTICE: A
PROSECUTOR’S GUIDE TO ETHICS AND CIVIL LIABILITIES 87, 90–102 (Amie L. Clifford, ed.,
2d ed. 2007) (collecting cases where discipline imposed included suspensions of various
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The few reported prosecutorial misconduct punishments might be
surprising. One may anticipate that even if prosecutors defend their own
and defense attorneys do not pursue complaints because of a repeat-player
concern, judges would have the independence and desire for fairness to
censure prosecutors or at least to report violations. Indeed, for this reason,
the ABA standards guide judges to “inform the appropriate authority” if
they know of violations of professional conduct or substantially question an
attorney’s honesty or trustworthiness. 217
As with other proposals to reduce prosecutorial misconduct, judges
have not played this role. Judicial opinions often state the unacceptability
of prosecutorial misconduct and its affront to justice, yet judges not only
fail to refer the prosecutor’s behavior to the “appropriate authority,” they
often do not name the prosecutor in their opinion.218 Further, in the state of
California, where a statute requires judges to refer prosecutors for discipline
when a misconduct violation reverses a conviction, not a single judge
followed this rule and referred a prosecutor for discipline. 219 Whether this
failure has more to do with a shared background, 220 their desire not to deter
prosecutors, 221 or their inability to enforce misconduct issues, 222 it is clear

lengths and public censures; suggesting that while punishment remains irregular, it is taking
place); see also Duff Wilson, Judge Says He Will Suspend Durham Prosecutor Immediately,
N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2007, at A-15 (reporting on the disbarment of the district attorney who
pursued false rape charges against the Duke lacrosse players).
217
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.15 (2008). Of course, one may question
who the “appropriate authorities” are and whether such authorities would publically report
either these referrals or subsequent disciplinary action. Despite such concerns, it seems
unlikely that such referrals are taking place regularly, as discussed in the text accompanying
notes 218–222.
218
Cf. In re Attorney C., 47 P.3d 1167, 1168 n.2, 1172 (Colo. 2002) (holding that a
prosecutor has an ethical duty to disclose exculpatory evidence and that the prosecutor did
not do so, but that the court would not punish the prosecutor and thus refrained from using
the person’s name in the opinion).
219
CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 71 (2008), available at
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf (finding no case of a judge
reporting prosecutorial misconduct, despite fifty-four identified situations where California
law required the judge to report and identify repeat offenders).
220
Many judges are former prosecutors. See, e.g., Armstrong & Possley, Break Rules,
supra note 207, at 1 (finding forty-two former Cook County prosecutors as judges after cases
reversed because of misconduct); Stephanie Woodrow, Senate Confirms Three ExProsecutors as Federal Judges, MAIN JUSTICE (Dec. 23, 2010, 1:23 PM),
http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/12/23/senate-confirms-three-ex-prosecutors-as-federaljudges/ (reporting on Senate confirmation for three ex-prosecutors and thirteen exprosecutors that the Senate did not act to confirm).
221
Sonja B. Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct, 97
GEO. L.J. 1509, 1517 (2009).
222
Cf. Ronald J. Allen & Ethan A. Hastert, From Winship to Apprendi to Booker:
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that judges have not held prosecutors accountable. Without accountability,
there is no incentive for local offices to train new prosecutors on Brady
doctrine concerns. The mentors of these new prosecutors have never seen
this as a problem because they have gone unpunished. And so, the
proposed judicial solution is yet one more regulatory mechanism that has
failed to show prosecutors a straight path, which training could reveal.
IV. INCENTIVES TO INCREASE TRAINING AND IMPROVE BRADY DOCTRINE
COMPLIANCE
Despite numerous proposals, as outlined in Part III.B, Brady violations
continue. The challenge for a would-be reformer is trying to make national
proposals for local problems. While one may desire a national policy like
“open file” discovery 223 or reducing the disclosure standard below
materiality, 224 neither is likely to become the constitutional doctrine of the
United States. 225 Similar desires to create civil liability or to implement the
other national proposals outlined supra Part III.B are bound to fail because
they do not deal with the local training problem.
Instead, what is needed to begin addressing Brady violations is a series
of modest changes that build on current state trends and realign local
incentives to encourage more training. When a state increases training, one
trend may finally be overcome: Justice Ginsburg’s concern of inadequately
trained prosecutors.
A. CHANGE STATE WRONGFUL CONVICTION FUNDS TO HOLD
COUNTIES RESPONSIBLE
A growing number of states now have wrongful conviction funds. 226
In general, these funds provide a convicted felon who served jail time and
can demonstrate innocence either a cause of action against the state or an

Constitutional Command or Constitutional Blunder?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 195, 195–98 (2005)
(arguing the courts have failed in their effort to regulate criminal charges available to
prosecutors, which may suggest that courts would also be unable to regulate prosecutors’
behavior in criminal cases).
223
Two states currently have “open-file” discovery—North Carolina and Ohio. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-903 (2011); OHIO R. OF CRIM. PROC. 16 (2010). It is likely that some
prosecutors’ offices in the country have also adopted this as a policy and procedure. See
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 276 (1999) (noting that a Virginia county maintains an
open-file policy for discovery). Yet it seems unlikely that this number will grow to a
majority of jurisdictions any time soon, even if one supports the policy.
224
Welch & Taylor, supra note 95.
225
See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (“We have never held that the
Constitution demands an open file policy . . . .”).
226
See supra notes 188–195 and accompanying text.
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administrative payment from the state. 227 In reviewing the statutes cited, all
state and federal schemes internalize costs of wrongful convictions on the
general taxpayer of the larger body. For example, California’s law provides
a payment from the state government based on the California Victim and
Compensation Government Claims Board’s determination of a fair
amount. 228 This payment will be made from the government in Sacramento
and not the county that hired or elected the prosecutor who acted
improperly. This holds true throughout the country. None of the statutes
hold accountable the local prosecutor’s office in the jurisdiction—such as a
county—where the wrongful conviction occurred.
By placing liability for the schemes on the state government,
legislatures may help the wrongfully convicted person receive monetary
compensation for the injustice in his life. The legislatures have not,
however, addressed the incentives of local prosecutors seeking convictions.
In fact, they may further misalign incentives because the state may step in
to defend the conviction on appeal—or, if the state’s compensation scheme
requires a wrongfully convicted person to initiate a civil lawsuit, it may step
in to defend that suit—to avoid a payout from the state-based fund,
reducing the county’s civil litigation costs. This does not rationally align
incentives. A more effective incentive would require the county both to pay
the costs of monetary compensation and to pay the legal bills for defending
these actions. In addition, consideration could be given to salary reductions
or modest financial penalties for the individual attorney to get her “skin” in
the game. While such a plan may increase the incentive to avoid
inappropriate prosecutions, lawmakers would also need to consider whether
it might lead to a reduction in legitimate prosecutions of difficult cases or
deter new professional prosecutors.
Such cost shifting—whether to counties or to individual prosecutors—
would not necessarily need to break the bank. While it is arguable that the
larger the percentage of funds put on local officials, the larger the
behavioral change would be, even small amounts can have an outsized
impact. 229 State governments could continue to supply most of the funding

227

See supra notes 188–195.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 4900 (West 2011).
229
Cf. Robert D. Pritchard & Michael I. Curtis, The Influence of Goal Setting and
Financial Incentives on Task Performance, 10 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
PERFORMANCE 175, 182 (1973) (pointing out that incentives need to reach at least a minimal
level before they have an impact—$3 worked better than 2¢); Stephanie Stern, Encouraging
Conservation on Private Lands: A Behavioral Analysis of Financial Incentives, 48 ARIZ. L.
REV. 541, 562–63 (2006) (suggesting that the most important factor for conservation
incentives was not the amount of the incentive, but that the incentive is in place across a time
period).
228
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and require, for instance, that counties contribute a modest 25% of wrongful
conviction liability. Creative state legislatures could build a graduated
system where county offices would be liable for a small monetary amount
at first, which would serve as a warning and encourage behavioral change,
but be liable for larger amounts of funds if misconduct continued over time.
Or the legislatures could consider safe harbors for meeting certain training
paradigms. Either modification would allow the county to engage in
retraining programs ensuring prosecutors know their respective
requirements. It could also allow the state scheme to give credit for such
retraining in the amount it charges the county.
Either way, the state would likely remain a backstop if a county were
unable to compensate the wrongfully accused. Together, the plan would
align the state, the county, the prosecutor (facing reduced salary), and the
defendant and result in fewer improper prosecutions.
B. REQUIRED TRAINING PROGRAMS ON BRADY EVIDENCE
While most prosecutors’ offices in this country are organized at the
county level and receive a significant portion of their funding from county
government, state funding to prosecutors’ offices is increasing. 230 With
additional money being spent on the offices, state governments should be
able to have more influence on their county prosecutors’ offices’
operations. With that additional power, states should insist on mandatory
training programs as suggested by both the ABA and the NDAA. 231
Ideally, this would be for all staff members in each office. But at a
minimum, states should insist on mandatory training for elected or
appointed head district attorneys before providing state funding to the
offices. This would be a powerful check on such offices and ensure that the
proper training for prosecutors is taking place.
One might suspect this proposal of having the same multi-actor
problem that prevents “open file” or civil liability proposals from working.
The major difference is that “open file” would likely require the action of
forty-eight legislatures. This proposal would only require the state
agencies charged with distribution of funds to the county prosecutors to put
some standards on the money going out their doors. This allows a different
political actor, with different incentives, to influence local behavior. In that

230

In 2005, less than a third of county prosecutors’ offices received only county funds.
PERRY, supra note 25, at 4. This is a large decline since 1994, when nearly half of all county
prosecutors’ offices received only county funds. CAROL J. DEFRANCES ET AL., BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 1994, at 2
(1996).
231
See supra notes 180–185 and accompanying text.
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way, this incentive could be used quickly to add financial pressures on local
offices to learn what prosecutors should already know under Brady.
This training could be in conjunction with a state bar’s continuing
legal education requirements. While a few states do not require continuing
legal education, 232 most do. 233 States should require prosecutors to
complete either additional hours of training in criminal-procedure-specific
topics or require all of their hours to be on such topics. This would not
require significant time or financial costs; continuing legal education is
available for prosecutors online. 234 The state just needs to make a point of
requiring training so that all prosecutors receive it.
C. NATIONAL GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES FOR
PROSECUTORIAL OFFICES
As explained in Part III.A of this Comment, national legal
organizations recommend that local prosecutorial offices develop their own
guidelines and policies to deal with the issue of discretion. 235 But many
offices are small, serving a population below 250,000 people, and have a
median staff size of ten, including nonattorney support staff.236 While wellintentioned, it may be an inefficient use of resources for each of these
offices to develop the policies and procedures that go into a document like
the United States Attorneys’ Manual.237 With small staffs lacking the same
cadre of experts as the Department of Justice, duplicating these efforts is
difficult.
Instead, a national standard handbook could provide a base document
that prosecutors’ offices could modify to suit their local operations. Such a
document would discuss best practices for Brady decisions, including how
the doctrine works, what a prosecutor’s obligations are, and guidelines for
other discretionary decisions. The NDAA is likely the best organization to

232

See, e.g., Randy Foreman, Continuing Legal Education in Michigan, MICH. B. J., Jan.
2008, at 44 (noting that Michigan is one of eight states that does not require continuing legal
education); Advancing Your Career, MASS. B. ASS’N, http://www.massbar.org/cle (last
visited Dec. 5, 2012) (noting that “Massachusetts is one of the few non-mandatory
[continuing legal education] states”).
233
See
MCLE
Information
by
Jurisdiction,
A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/publications_cle/mandatory_cle/mcle_states.html (last visited
Mar. 1, 2012) (providing information about required continuing legal education in each
state); see also supra note 232 (noting how non-mandatory states recognize their rarity).
234
Thomas J. Charron, NDAA Begins Distance Learning, PROSECUTOR, May/June 2005,
at 6.
235
See supra notes 179–185 and accompanying text.
236
PERRY, supra note 25, at 3.
237
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 184.
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take on such a project. The organization had thirteen training conferences
scheduled over the last six months of 2012 238 and numerous educational
The organization would also have their National
publications. 239
Prosecution Standards to begin the project. But such a document would
need to go beyond being merely an “aspirational guide to professional
conduct in the performance of the prosecutorial function.” 240 It would need
to include hypothetical situations, potential considerations of a prosecutor
who faces challenges in understanding the doctrine, and guidance to fulfill
Brady obligations. It would be the standard handbook of how to actually do
the job of being a prosecutor, not just suggestions for how to be a
professional. This guide would have the added benefit of being usable by a
single prosecutor even if her office was not providing necessary training,
thus ensuring all national prosecutors knew the basic requirements of the
job.
V. CONCLUSION
As a postscript to the Connick v. Thompson case, earlier this year and
for the second time in seventeen years,241 the Supreme Court reversed a
conviction involving the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office for
failing to follow the Brady doctrine requirements in a criminal
prosecution. 242 In the latest case, Smith v. Cain, the petitioner asked the
Supreme Court to reverse a first-degree murder conviction based solely on
the testimony of a single eyewitness. 243 Unknown to the petitioner’s trial
defense team, the prosecution knew that the sole eyewitness had previously
stated on more than one occasion that he could not identify his attackers. 244
Furthering this injustice, a newspaper photo of the petitioner as a witness
may have tainted the eyewitness’s identification.245
Despite such a clear violation of Brady, prompting Justice Scalia to
suggest during oral argument that the respondent’s attorney could have

238

All Upcoming Courses, NAT’L DISTRICT ATT’YS ASS’N, http://www.ndaa.org/
upcoming_courses.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2012).
239
Publications, NAT’L DISTRICT ATT’YS ASS’N, http://www.ndaa.org/publications.html
(last visited Dec. 5, 2012).
240
NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 153, at 1.
241
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
242
Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 631 (2012).
243
Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, 10–11, Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627 (2011) (No.
10-8145), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/
10-8145.pdf (discussing the lack of any other evidence linking the petitioner to the crime).
244
Id. at 3, 6, 46 (explaining that detective’s notes say the eyewitness “could not ID;
would not know them if I saw them; can’t tell if had faces covered; didn’t see anyone”).
245
Id. at 5.
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“stop[ped] fighting” about the necessity to turn over the information, 246 the
respondent’s attorney continued to argue that this eyewitness’s
contradictory statements made no difference. 247 In a relatively short
opinion, the Supreme Court reversed because the prosecution’s only
evidence was cast into doubt by undisclosed material information. 248
While the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office clearly is an
extreme example of prosecutorial misconduct,249 Smith v. Cain represents
one of countless Brady violations that occur each year.250 Unfortunately,
this misconduct happens more often than one would like and the
misconduct is not contained to a single jurisdiction. 251 Prosecutorial
misconduct threatens the due process rights of defendants. Legal scholars
have spent much time trying to develop ways to police prosecutors or
reduce their discretion. Yet these proposals have either not been adopted or
have not had an impact.252
As this Comment discusses, the problem remains that prosecutorial
training is simply not adequate to prepare lawyers to apply doctrines as
complex as Brady. In Connick v. Thompson, Justice Thomas, writing for
the majority of the Court, indicated his belief that as legal professionals,
prosecutors have the training and ethical obligation to learn on their own. 253
While this may be theoretically true, Justice Ginsburg is correct in dissent
that law school and current legal structures are not enough. Additional
training is necessary. Whether this training comes in response to financial
pressure, threat of job loss or financial penalties, or the dissemination of
national standards, more is needed. Only then can the nation ensure that
“justice shall be done.” 254

246
Id. at 51; see also id. at 49–50 (Justice Kagan asking respondent whether her “office
ever consider[ed] just confessing error in this case? . . . We took cert a while ago. I’m just
wondering whether you’ve ever considered confessing error.”).
247
Id. at 29, 33, 38, 43–46.
248
Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 631 (2012). By contrast, Justice Thomas, the lone
dissenter, spent much longer reviewing the factual record, id. at 633–39, and suggested that
the information withheld from Smith was not enough to “establish[] a reasonable probability
that the cumulative effect of this evidence would have caused the jury to change its verdict.”
Id. at 633.
249
Brief for Orleans Public Defenders Office as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
5–10, Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012) (No. 10-8145), 2011 WL 3706111 (detailing the
long history of Brady abuses committed over the last twenty years by the Orleans Parish
District Attorney’s Office).
250
See supra Part II.B.
251
Supra Part II.B.
252
See supra Part III.B.
253
See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1361–63 (2011).
254
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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APPENDIX

School

Law

Procedure

The following is a list of all 202 ABA-accredited law schools 255 with
information about whether they require criminal law and criminal
procedure.

Albany Law School

Y

N

American University,
Washington College of
Law
Appalachian School of
Law
Arizona State University,
Sandra Day O’Connor
College of Law

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Atlanta’s John Marshall
Law School
Ave Maria School of Law

Y

N

Y

Y

Barry University, Dwayne
O. Andreas School of Law
Baylor University, Sheila
& Walter Umphrey Law
Center
Boston College Law
School
Boston University School
of Law

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Website
http://www.albanylaw.edu/media/user/registrar/Class_of_20
12_Requirements.pdf
http://www.wcl.american.edu/registrar/required.cfm

http://www.asl.edu/The-Program/AcademicStandards.html#curriculum
http://www.law.asu.edu/currentstudents/CurrentStudents/Ac
ademics/JurisDoctorCurriculum/FirstYearRequiredCourses.a
spx,
http://www.law.asu.edu/currentstudents/CurrentStudents/Ac
ademics/JurisDoctorCurriculum/UpperDivisionCourseOfferi
ngs.aspx,
http://www.law.asu.edu/admissions/Admissions/DegreeProg
rams/JDProgram.aspx
http://www.johnmarshall.edu/futurestudent/j-dprogram/courses/
http://www.avemarialaw.edu/academics/RequiredCurriculu
m
http://www.barry.edu/law/future-students/academicprogram/full-time-day-program.html
http://www.baylor.edu/law/ps/index.php?id=75581

http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/services/academic/programs/
curriculum/guide/
http://www.bu.edu/law/prospective/jd/first/curriculum.html,
http://www.bu.edu/law/prospective/jd/courses/

255
The ABA has accredited 202 schools; the three schools that have been approved
provisionally—UC-Irvine, La Verne, and UMass-Dartmouth—are denoted with an asterisk.
See ABA-Approved Law Schools by Year, A. B. A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
legal_education/resources/aba_approved_law_schools/by_year_approved.html (last visited
Nov. 26, 2012). However, the ABA’s accreditation of the Justice Advocate General’s Legal
Center and School is not for general law students, but for those pursuing a master of laws
degree in military law. See Judge Advocate General Graduate Course, JUDGE ADVOC. GEN.
LEGAL CENTER & SCH., https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/8525736A005BC8F9/0/CE89C608
13E53611852573550051C3D8?opendocument (last visited Nov. 26, 2012). Due to this
limited accreditation and purpose, the school is not included in this analysis.
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Brigham Young
University, J. Reuben Clark
Law School

Y

N

Brooklyn Law School

Y

N

California Western School
of Law

Y

Y

Campbell University,
Norman Adrian Wiggins
School of Law
Capital University Law
School
Case Western Reserve
University School of Law

Y

Y

http://www.law2.byu.edu/page/categories/student_resources/
course_materials/How%20to%20Choose%20Your%20Cour
ses%202011-12.pdf,
http://www.law2.byu.edu/page/?id=prospective&cat=admiss
ions&content=requirements_for_graduation#view
http://www.brooklaw.edu/academics/curriculum/firstyearpro
gram.aspx,
http://www.brooklaw.edu/academics/curriculum/coursesbyar
ea.aspx
http://www.cwsl.edu/main/default.asp?nav=academic_progr
ams.asp&body=academic_programs/first_year_curriculum.a
sp,
http://www.cwsl.edu/main/default.asp?nav=academic_progr
ams.asp&body=academic_programs/upper_class_curriculum
.asp
http://law.campbell.edu/page.cfm?id=392&n=curriculum

Y

N

http://law.capital.edu/JD_Curriculum/

Y

N

Chapman University
School of Law

Y

N

Charleston School of Law

Y

Y

Charlotte School of Law

Y

Y

Chicago-Kent College of
Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology
City University of New
York School of Law
Cleveland State University,
Cleveland-Marshall
College of Law

Y

N

http://law.case.edu/Academics/JDCurriculum.aspx,
http://law.case.edu/Academics/Concentrations/CriminalLaw.
aspx
http://www.chapman.edu/law/programs/courses/required.asp
, http://www.chapman.edu/law/academic-programs/coursedescriptions/required.aspx
http://www.charlestonlaw.edu/AcademicAffairs/Graduation-Requirements.aspx
http://www.charlottelaw.org/sites/default/files/academics/Ful
l-Time%20Day%20Fall%20Beginning.pdf,
http://www.charlottelaw.org/sites/default/files/academics/Ful
l-Time%20Day%20Spring%20Beginning.pdf
http://www.kentlaw.edu/depts/acadadm/handbook.html#1.2,
http://www.kentlaw.edu/depts/acadadm/handbook.html#11.2

Y

N

Y

N

College of William and
Mary, Marshall-Wythe
Law School

Y

N

Columbia University Law
School

Y

N

Cornell University Law
School

Y

N

http://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/courses.html,
http://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/courses/first-year.html
https://www.law.csuohio.edu/academics/curriculum/jdrequir
ements,
https://www.law.csuohio.edu/academics/curriculum/coursed
escriptions-ad#C
http://web.wm.edu/law/academics/programs/jd/requirements
/firstyearcourses/index.php?svr=law,
http://web.wm.edu/law/academics/programs/jd/electives/cou
rses/bytitle/index.php?svr=law
https://www.law.columbia.edu/jd_applicants/curriculum/1l,
http://www.law.columbia.edu/courses/browse?global.c_id=3
011
http://support.law.cornell.edu/students/forms/current_Course
_Descriptions.pdf
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Creighton University
School of Law

N

Y

DePaul University School
of Law

Y

N

Detroit College of Law
(now Michigan State
University College of Law)
Dickinson School of Law
(now Pennsylvania State
University, The Dickinson
School of Law)
Drake University Law
School

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

N

Drexel University Earle
Mack School of Law

Y

N

Duke University School of
Law

Y

N

Duquesne University
School of Law
Elon University School of
Law
Emory University School
of Law
Faulkner University,
Thomas Goode Jones
School of Law
Florida A&M University
College of Law

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

N

Florida Coastal School of
Law

Y

Y

Florida International
University College of Law

Y

N

Florida State University
College of Law

Y

N

Fordham University School
of Law

Y

N
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http://www.creighton.edu/law/academics/curriculum/index.p
hp,
http://www.creighton.edu/law/academics/coursedescriptions/
index.php
http://www.law.depaul.edu/programs/general%5Fjd/,
http://www.law.depaul.edu/programs/course_descriptions.as
p
http://www.law.msu.edu/academics/ac-juris-sched.html,
http://www.law.msu.edu/academics/courses.php?let1=C&let
2=D
http://law.psu.edu/academics/jd/first_year

http://www.law.drake.edu/academics/?pageID=requiredCour
ses,
http://www.law.drake.edu/academics/?pageID=coursesCD
http://earlemacklaw.drexel.edu/studentLife/studentAffairs/gr
aduation_requirements/;
http://earlemacklaw.drexel.edu/academics/offerings/
http://www.law.duke.edu/curriculum/firstyr,
http://www.law.duke.edu/curriculum/courseinfo/courses?upp
er=checked
http://www.duq.edu/academics/schools/law/academicprograms/curriculum-outline
http://www.elon.edu/e-web/law/academics/curriculum.xhtml
http://www.law.emory.edu/academics/academiccatalog/course-descriptions.html
http://www.faulkner.edu/JSL/academics/documents/revisedc
urriculum.pdf
http://law.famu.edu/go.cfm/do/Page.View/pid/50/t/RequiredCourse-Sequence;
http://law.famu.edu/go.cfm/do/Page.View/pid/59/t/ElectiveCourses
https://www.fcsl.edu/sites/fcsl.edu/files/audit%20Fall%2006
%20and%20after%20_Skills_%20Curriculum%20Requirem
ents-90%20credits-UPDATE2.pdf
http://law.fiu.edu/academic-information/college-of-lawcurriculum/;
http://catalog.fiu.edu/2011_2012/Graduate/College_of_Law/
Graduate_College_of_Law.pdf
http://www.law.fsu.edu/academic_programs/jd_program/firs
t_year.html,
http://www.law.fsu.edu/academic_programs/curriculum/cour
se_descriptions.html
http://law.fordham.edu/registrar/18255.htm
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George Mason University
School of Law

Y

N

http://www.law.gmu.edu/academics/degrees/jd/jd_curriculu
m_2012_later,
http://www.law.gmu.edu/academics/concentrations/crim_la
w
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academicprograms/jd-program/full-time-program/first-year.cfm
http://law.gsu.edu/students/4755.html#fulltime

Georgetown University
Law Center 256
Georgia State University
College of Law
Golden Gate University
School of Law
Gonzaga University School
of Law
Hamline University School
of Law
Harvard University Law
School
Hofstra University School
of Law
Howard University School
of Law
Indiana University School
of Law-Bloomington

Y

N

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

Indiana University School
of Law-Indianapolis
Inter American University
of Puerto Rico, School of
Law
Lewis and Clark College
Law School
Liberty University School
of Law
Louisiana State University,
Paul M. Hebert Law Center

Y

N

Y

Y

N

Y

https://www.lclark.edu/live/files/8443

Y

Y

http://law.liberty.edu/index.cfm?PID=8966

Y

Y

Loyola Law School-Los
Angeles
Loyola University-New
Orleans College of Law

Y

N

http://www.law.lsu.edu/index.cfm?geaux=academics.require
dandelectivecourses,
http://www.law.lsu.edu/globals/sitelibraries/academics/lsula
wcatalog/LSULawCatalog_20122013.pdf
http://intranet.lls.edu/tracks/required.html

Y

Y

Loyola University-Chicago
School of Law

Y

N

http://law.ggu.edu/media/law/documents/jd-prospectus2013.pdf
http://www.law.gonzaga.edu/academics/curriculum/required/
http://law.hamline.edu/jd/course_descriptions.html,
http://law.hamline.edu/course_descriptions.html
http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/degrees/jd/index.htm
l
http://law.hofstra.edu/academics/degreeprograms/jdprogram/
fulltimejd/firstyear/index.html,
http://www.law.howard.edu/law_school_curriculum
http://www.law.indiana.edu/degrees/doc/academic_regulatio
ns.pdf,
http://apps.law.indiana.edu/degrees/courses/lookup.asp
http://indylaw.indiana.edu/courses/required.cfm,
http://indylaw.indiana.edu/courses/elective.cfm
http://www.derecho.inter.edu/inter/sites/default/files/docume
ntos_generales/catalogo_2011.pdf

http://2009bulletin.loyno.edu/law/academic_regs/contents.ph
p#req_course_ft,
http://2009bulletin.loyno.edu/law/courses/electives_law.php,
http://www.loyno.edu/~medina/descrip.htm
http://luc.edu/law/registrar/degree_requirements/guidelines.h
tml,http://www.luc.edu/law/courses/criminal.html

256
Georgetown features two tracks for first-year students—one requiring a traditional
criminal law course and the other requiring a criminal justice seminar. See First-Year
Information, GEORGETOWN L., http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academicprograms/jd-program/full-time-program/first-year.cfm (last visited Nov. 26, 2012).
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Marquette University Law
School
McGeorge School of Law,
The University of the
Pacific

Y

N

http://law.marquette.edu/current-students/graduationrequirements,
http://www.mcgeorge.edu/Future_Students/JD_Programs/Re
quirements_and_Curriculum/FirstYear_Required_Curriculum.htm,
http://www.mcgeorge.edu/Future_Students/JD_Programs/Re
quirements_and_Curriculum/Upper_Level_Curriculum.htm
http://law.mercer.edu/academics/registrar/required15,
http://www2.law.mercer.edu/courses/index.cfm?blockid=7
http://law.mc.edu/academics/first-year-curriculum/,
http://law.mc.edu/academics/courses/#Criminal
http://www.nesl.edu/students/required_courses.cfm
http://www.nyls.edu/academics/catalog_and_schedule/requir
ed_courses,
http://www.nyls.edu/academics/catalog_and_schedule/alpha
_list
http://www.law.nyu.edu/academics/courses/requiredfirstyear
courses/index.htm,
http://its.law.nyu.edu/courses/index.cfm?sortLabel=Semester
&searchButton=1&keyword=&coursetitle=&viewFirstYear
=&CourseInstructorId=&CourseType=&AreasOfStudyID=1
1&CourseTerm=&ExactCode=&Block=&CourseCredits=&
startTime=&endTime=&location=&pastSemesters=Y&page
=2
http://law.nccu.edu/academics/curriculum-description/firstyear-courses/, http://law.nccu.edu/academics/curriculumdescription/recommended-courses/
http://www.northeastern.edu/law/academics/curriculum/firstyear/index.html,
http://www.northeastern.edu/law/academics/curriculum/uppe
r-level/index.html
http://law.niu.edu/law/academic/first_year/index.shtml,
http://law.niu.edu/law/academic/courses1.shtml
http://chaselaw.nku.edu/academics/full_time_day.php,
http://chaselaw.nku.edu/academics/course_offerings.php

Y

Y

Mercer University, Walter
F. George School of Law
Mississippi College School
of Law
New England Law/Boston
New York Law School

Y

N

Y

N

Y
Y

Y
N

New York University
School of Law

Y

N

North Carolina Central
University School of Law

Y

N

Northeastern University
School of Law

Y

N

Northern Illinois
University College of Law
Northern Kentucky
University, Salmon P.
Chase College of Law
Northwestern University
School of Law
Nova Southeastern
University, Shepard Broad
Law Center
Ohio Northern University
Claude W. Pettit College of
Law
Oklahoma City University
College of Law

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

N

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/academics/jd/#gradreqs

Y

N

http://nsulaw.nova.edu/students/course-descriptions.cfm

Y

N

http://law.onu.edu/sites/default/files/Graduation%20Check%
20List%20(Updated%2010-22-12).pdf

Y

Y

Pace University School of
Law
Pepperdine University
School of Law

Y

N

Y

Y

http://law.okcu.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2012/08/REQUIRED-CURRICULUM-01July-20121.pdf
http://www.law.pace.edu/juris-doctor-program,
http://www.law.pace.edu/course-descriptions-0
http://law.pepperdine.edu/academics/content/catalog2012.pd
f, page 156
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Phoenix School of Law

Y

Y

Pontifical Catholic
University of Puerto Rico
School of Law
Quinnipiac University
School of Law
Regent University School
of Law

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Roger Williams University
School of Law
Rutgers School of Law Newark

Y

Y

Y

N

Rutgers School of LawCamden

Y

N

Saint Louis University
School of Law
Samford University,
Cumberland School of Law

Y

N

Y

N

Santa Clara University
School of Law

Y

N

Seattle University School
of Law

Y

N

Seton Hall University
School of Law

Y

N

South Texas College of
Law

Y

N

Southern Illinois
University School of Law
Southern Methodist
University, Dedman School
of Law

Y

N

Y

N

Southern University Law
Center

Y

Y

Southwestern Law School

Y

Y
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http://www.phoenixlaw.edu/downloads/Student%20Handbo
ok.pdf
http://spserver2008.pucpr.edu/derecho/index.php?option=co
m_content&view=article&id=145%3Acatalogo-20102012&catid=909%3Acatalogo&Itemid=199&lang=en
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/prebuilt/pdf/law_catalog20122013.pdf
http://www.regent.edu/acad/schlaw/academics/req_courses.c
fm,
http://www.regent.edu/acad/schlaw/student_life/docs/course
descriptions.pdf
http://law.rwu.edu/academics/curriculum
http://law.newark.rutgers.edu/admissions-financial-aid/firstyear-curriculum-overview,
http://law.newark.rutgers.edu/students/master-courselist#anchor
http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/rutgers-law-school-rulesregulations-and-policies#rule6.1,
http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/students/schedules/classes.shtml
http://www.slu.edu/x48935.xml,
http://www.slu.edu/x48939.xml
http://cumberland.samford.edu/students/studentrecords/course-requirements,
http://cumberland.samford.edu/courses
http://law.scu.edu/bulletin/academicpolicies.cfm#Graduation,
http://law.scu.edu/academics/courses/criminal-procedure310.cfm
http://www.law.seattleu.edu/Academics/Curriculum/Academ
ic_Requirements.xml,
http://www.law.seattleu.edu/Academics/Curriculum/Course_
Offerings.xml
http://law.shu.edu/Students/academics/curriculum/JDCurriculum-Requirements.cfm,
http://law.shu.edu/Students/academics/CourseCatalogue.cfm?subjectName=Criminal%20Law%20and%20
Procedure
http://www.stcl.edu/admissions/student_status.html,
http://www.stcl.edu/registrar/StudentHandbk201112revOct2011.pdf
http://www.law.siu.edu/Current%20Students/PDF/crsrqt.pdf
http://www.law.smu.edu/Prospective-Students/J-D-Programs/Full-Time-J-D--Curriculum.aspx,
http://smu.edu/catalogs/2009/dedman/law/curriculum.asp#m
ba
http://www.sulc.edu/Departments/Enrollment/Registration/C
atalog.html,
http://www.sulc.edu/Departments/Enrollment/pdf/49337_SU
_Catalog%20lowres.pdf
http://www.swlaw.edu/academics/jd/dayprogram
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St. John's University
School of Law

Y

N

St. Mary's University
School of Law

Y

N

St. Thomas University
School of Law (Florida)
Stanford University Law
School

Y

N

Y

N

Stetson University School
of Law

Y

N

Suffolk University Law
Center

Y

N

Syracuse University
College of Law

Y

N

Temple University, James
E. Beasley School of Law

Y

N

Texas Southern University,
Thurgood Marshall School
of Law
Texas Tech University
School of Law
Texas Wesleyan University
School of Law
The Catholic University of
America, Columbus School
of Law
The George Washington
University Law School

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

N

The John Marshall Law
School (Chicago)
The Ohio State University,
Michael E. Moritz College
of Law
The University of Akron
School of Law

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

1317

http://www.stjohns.edu/academics/graduate/law/academics/c
ourses/C.stj,
http://www.stjohns.edu/download.axd/591364a68531449584
5dcc7840965c15.pdf?d=Student%20Handbook%20201112%20v5
http://www.stmarytx.edu/law/index.php?site=firstYearCurric
ulum,
http://www.stmarytx.edu/law/index.php?site=secondThirdY
earCurriculum
http://www.stu.edu/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=NrKTJKIUVp
o%3d&tabid=850
http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/courses/#2nd3rd_year_program,
http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/courses/#1st_year_cur
riculum
http://www.law.stetson.edu/academics/curriculum/requiredcurriculum.php#fulltimerequired,
http://www.law.stetson.edu/offices/registrar/coursedescriptions.php#electives
http://www.law.suffolk.edu/academic/jd/required.cfm,
http://www.law.suffolk.edu/academic/jd/electives.cfm?Let=
C
http://www.law.syr.edu/academics/coursedescriptions/course-list.aspx?cat=19,
http://www.law.syr.edu/academics/coursedescriptions/course-list.aspx?cat=40
http://www.law.temple.edu/Pages/Current_Students/Current
_Acad_Grad_Req.aspx,
http://www4.law.temple.edu/courseinfo/CourseDescriptions.
aspx
http://www.tsulaw.edu/academics/curriculum.html

http://www.depts.ttu.edu/officialpublications/LawSchool/ind
ex.html
http://law.txwes.edu/CurrentStudents/CourseDescriptions/Co
urseDescriptions201112/tabid/1578/Default.aspx#lockstep
http://www.law.edu/res/docs/registrar/Degree%20Requireme
nts%20and%20FAQ.pdf
http://www.law.gwu.edu/Academics/curriculum/Pages/electi
ve.aspx,
http://www.law.gwu.edu/Academics/curriculum/Pages/requi
red.aspx
http://www.jmls.edu/registrar/pdf/required-coursechecklist.pdf
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/academics/graduation_requirements
.php
http://www.uakron.edu/dotAsset/1837471.pdf,
http://www.uakron.edu/law/curriculum/courseAE.dot.
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The University of Alabama
School of Law
The University of Arizona,
James E. Rogers College of
Law
The University of Arkansas
School of Law-Fayetteville
The University of Montana
School of Law
The University of New
Mexico School of Law

Y

N

http://www.law.ua.edu/academics/

N

Y

http://www.law.arizona.edu/current_students/academic_prog
rams/courses_master_list.cfm

Y

N

http://catalogofstudies.uark.edu/4362.php

Y

N

http://www.umt.edu/law/students/firstyear.php

Y

N

The University of
Tennessee College of Law
The University of Texas
School of Law
The University of Tulsa
College of Law

Y

N

http://lawschool.unm.edu/academics/curriculum/oneL/index.php,
http://lawschool.unm.edu/academics/curriculum/upperclass/i
ndex.php
http://law.utk.edu/academic-programs/jd-requirements/

Y

N

https://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/degrees/jd.html

Y

N

Thomas Jefferson School
of Law
Thomas M. Cooley Law
School
Touro College, Jacob D.
Fuchsberg Law Center
Tulane University School
of Law

Y

Y

Y

Y

http://www.utulsa.edu/academics/colleges/college-oflaw/Academic%20Programs/Juris%20Doctor%20Program.a
spx
http://www.tjsl.edu/academics/curriculumrequirements/required-courses
http://www.cooley.edu/prospective/required.html

Y

N

http://www.tourolaw.edu/Academics/?pageid=65

Y

N

University at Buffalo Law
School

Y

N

University of Arkansas at
Little Rock, William H.
Bowen School of Law

Y

N

University of Baltimore
School of Law

Y

N

University of CaliforniaBerkeley, College of Law
University of CaliforniaDavis, School of Law

Y

N

Y

N

University of CaliforniaHastings, School of Law

Y

N

http://www.law.tulane.edu/tlsAcademicPrograms/index.aspx
?id=1732,
http://www.law.tulane.edu/tlsAcademicPrograms/courseDeta
il.aspx?&__taxonomyid=2&__ecmcurrentpage=3,
http://www.law.tulane.edu/tlsAcademicPrograms/courseDeta
il.aspx?&__taxonomyid=2&__ecmcurrentpage=4
http://law.buffalo.edu/Academic_Programs_And_Research/d
efault.asp?firstlevel=0&secondlevel=2&filename=jd_progra
m#first,
http://law.buffalo.edu/Academic_Programs_And_Research/d
efault.asp?filename=conCrimLaw#2
http://ualr.edu/law/academics/curriculum/requiredcurriculum/,
http://ualr.edu/law/academics/curriculum/coursedescriptions/
http://law.ubalt.edu/template.cfm?page=27,
http://law.ubalt.edu/template.cfm?page=28,
http://law.ubalt.edu/downloads/law_downloads/20112012%20Catalog%20Final%206-29.pdf
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/162.htm,
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/8063.htm
http://www.law.ucdavis.edu/current/registrar/curriculum.htm
l, http://www.law.ucdavis.edu/current/registrar/curriculumupper-division.html
http://www.uchastings.edu/academics/catalog/docs/CAT1112.pdf
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University of CaliforniaIrvine School of Law*
University of CaliforniaLos Angeles, School of
Law
University of Chicago Law
School
University of Cincinnati
College of Law

Y

N

http://www.law.uci.edu/registrar/curriculum.html,
http://apps.law.uci.edu/CourseCatalog/Search.aspx
http://www.law.ucla.edu/academic-programs-andcourses/curriculum/Pages/first-year-curriculum.aspx

Y

N

Y

N

http://www.law.uchicago.edu/courses

Y

N

University of Colorado
Law School
University of Connecticut
School of Law

Y

N

http://www.law.uc.edu/prospective-students/academicprograms/first-year-curiculum,
http://www.law.uc.edu/prospective-students/academicprograms/upper-level-experience,
http://www.law.uc.edu/prospective-students/academicprograms/areas-study/criminal-law
http://www.colorado.edu/law/academics/requirements.htm

Y

N

University of Dayton
School of Law

Y

N

University of Denver
Sturm College of Law

Y

N

University of Detroit
Mercy School of Law
University of Florida,
Fredric G. Levin College of
Law
University of Georgia
School of Law
University of Hawai’i,
William S. Richardson
School of Law
University of Houston Law
Center
University of Idaho
College of Law

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

http://www.law.uga.edu/required-courses

Y

N

http://www.law.hawaii.edu/jd/degree-requirements

Y

N

Y

N

University of Illinois
College of Law
University of Iowa College
of Law
University of Kansas
School of Law

Y

N

http://www.law.uh.edu/academic/jd.html,
http://www.uh.edu/grad_catalog/law/law_courses.html
http://www.uidaho.edu/law/academics/courseanddescription/
firstyearcourses,
http://www.uidaho.edu/~/media/Files/orgs/Law/academics/A
dministration/Catalog-Law-Student-Handbook-2012-20139-4-12.ashx
http://www.law.illinois.edu/academics/curriculum

Y

N

Y

N

http://www.law.uconn.edu/student-handbook/academicregulations/academic-requirements/requirements-jurisdoctor-degree
http://www.udayton.edu/law/academics/jd_program/core_co
urses.php,
http://community.udayton.edu/law/academics/curriculum/ele
ctive_courses.php
http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/admissions/jdadmissions/degree-requirements,
http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/registrar/courseinformation/required-courses/academicrequirements/required-course-list,
http://www.law.du.edu/forms/registrar/course-list.cfm
http://www.law.udmercy.edu/index.php/academics1/required
-and-bar-related-courses
http://www.law.ufl.edu/academics/degree-programs/jurisdoctor/course-selection

http://www.law.uiowa.edu/academics/,
http://www.law.uiowa.edu/documents/courses.pdf
http://www.law.ku.edu/courses,
http://www.law.ku.edu/requiredcourses
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University of Kentucky
College of Law
University of La Verne
College of Law*
University of Louisville,
Louis D. Brandeis School
of Law
University of Maine School
of Law
University of Maryland
School of Law

Y

N

http://www.law.uky.edu/index.php?pid=171

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

University of
Massachusetts School of
Law-Dartmouth*
University of Memphis
School of Law
University of Miami
School of Law
University of Michigan
Law School
University of Minnesota
Law School
University of Mississippi
School of Law
University of MissouriColumbia, School of Law
University of MissouriKansas City School of Law
University of Nebraska
College of Law
University of Nevada-Las
Vegas, William S. Boyd
School of Law
University of New
Hampshire School of Law
University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill
School of Law
University of North Dakota
School of Law

Y

Y

http://law.laverne.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/Catalog2011-12-Final.pdf
http://www.law.louisville.edu/academics/1L,
http://www.law.louisville.edu/academics/graduationrequirements
http://mainelaw.maine.edu/academics/academicprogram/list-courses.html
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/academics/program/,
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/academics/program/curriculu
m/catalog/index.html
http://www.umassd.edu/law/academics/curriculum/

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

N

N

Y

Y

N

http://www.law.unc.edu/academics/courses/default.aspx;
http://www.law.unc.edu/academics/courses/firstyear/

Y

N

University of Notre Dame
Law School

Y

N

University of Oklahoma
College of Law

Y

Y

University of Oregon
School of Law

Y

N

http://law.und.edu/academics/courses.cfm,
http://law.und.edu/students/policy-manual/generalrequirements.cfm
http://law.nd.edu/academics/degrees/j-d/first-year/,
http://law.nd.edu/academics/degrees/j-d/second-and-thirdyears/
http://jay.law.ou.edu/studentinfo/coursedescription/courses.c
fm?action=udr,
http://jay.law.ou.edu/studentinfo/coursedescription/courses.c
fm?action=fyr
http://law.uoregon.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/201213-Law-Course-Catalog.pdf

http://www.memphis.edu/law/currentstudents/coursestudy.p
hp
http://www.law.miami.edu/currentstudents/degree_requirem
ents/jd_first_year_requirements.php?op=1
http://web.law.umich.edu/_ClassSchedule/CourseList.asp
http://www.law.umn.edu/prospective/courseguide.html#s11,
http://www.law.umn.edu/prospective/curriculum2.html
http://law.olemiss.edu/academics-programs/j-dprogram/curriculum/
http://law.missouri.edu/academics/requirements.html#requir
ed
http://law.umkc.edu/academics/j-d-requirements.asp
http://law.unl.edu/curriculum#upper,
http://law.unl.edu/curriculum#first
http://law.unlv.edu/academics/courses/samplecurriculum.html#sample-fulltime;
http://law.unlv.edu/academics/courses/list-of-electives.html
http://law.unh.edu/academics/jd-degree
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University of Pennsylvania
Law School
University of Pittsburgh
School of Law

Y

N

Y

N

University of Puerto Rico
School of Law

Y

N

University of Richmond,
T.C. Williams School of
Law

Y

N

University of San Diego
School of Law

Y

N

University of San
Francisco School of Law
University of South
Carolina School of Law
University of South Dakota
School of Law
University of Southern
California, Gould School
of Law

Y

N

https://www.law.upenn.edu/academics/degrees.php,
https://www.law.upenn.edu/academics/jd-requirements.php
http://www.law.pitt.edu/academics/courses/catalog,
http://www.law.pitt.edu/academics/courses/catalog/1L,
http://www.law.pitt.edu/academics/juris-doctor
http://lspt1.law.upr.edu/pls/portal/url/ITEM/BE204121592847FEA3
12916D7B6F8BDB
http://law.richmond.edu/academics/curriculum/firstyear.html,
http://law.richmond.edu/academics/curriculum/upperlevel.html
http://www.sandiego.edu/law/academics/jd/curriculum/first_
year_courses.php,
http://www.sandiego.edu/law/academics/jd/curriculum/gradu
ation_requirements.php
http://www.usfca.edu/law/jd/curriculum/fulltime/

Y

N

http://law.sc.edu/academics/jd_description.shtml

Y

Y

Y

N

University of St. Thomas
School of Law (Minnesota)

Y

N

University of the District of
Columbia, David A. Clarke
School of Law
University of Toledo
College of Law
University of Utah, S.J.
Quinney College of Law

Y

Y

http://www.usd.edu/law/academics.cfm,
http://www.usd.edu/law/upload/CurriculumGuidebook.pdf
http://lawweb.usc.edu/why/academics/curriculum/firstYearC
urriculum.cfm,
http://lawweb.usc.edu/why/academics/curriculum/upperDivi
sion.cfm
http://www.stthomas.edu/law/academics/courses/firstyearco
urses/,
http://www.stthomas.edu/law/academics/courses/upperlevelc
ourses/
http://www.law.udc.edu/?page=FullTimeCurriculum

Y

N

http://law.utoledo.edu/students/pdf/CourseDescriptions.pdf

Y

N

University of Virginia
School of Law
University of Washington
School of Law

Y

N

http://www.law.utah.edu/current/course-list/,
http://www.law.utah.edu/student-handbook/graduationrequirements/#required
http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/academics/curriculum.htm

Y

N

University of Wisconsin
Law School
University of Wyoming
College of Law

Y

Y

Y

N

Valparaiso University
School of Law

Y

N

http://www.law.washington.edu/CourseCatalog/CourseList.a
spx?YR=2011&Tp=LEVEL&Cd=FIRSTYEAR,
http://www.law.washington.edu/CourseCatalog/CourseList.a
spx?YR=2011&Tp=TOPIC&Cd=PUBCRIMINAL
http://www.law.wisc.edu/prospective/firstyear.htm
http://www.uwyo.edu/law/current-students/courses-andcurriculum/curriculum.html#First%20Year%20Required%2
0Curriculum
http://www.valpo.edu/law/current-students/law-registrar/cresources/c-courses-2
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Vanderbilt University Law
School

Y

N

Vermont Law School

Y

N

Villanova University
School of Law
Wake Forest University
School of Law
Washburn University
School of Law
Washington and Lee
University School of Law
Washington University
School of Law
Wayne State University
Law School
West Virginia University
College of Law
Western New England
College School of Law

Y

N

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

Western State University
College of Law
Whittier Law School

Y

Y

Y

Y

Widener University School
of Law- Harrisburg
Widener University School
of Law-Wilmington
(Delaware)
Willamette University
College of Law
William Mitchell College
of Law
Yale University

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

N

N

Y

N

Yeshiva University,
Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law

Y

N
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http://law.vanderbilt.edu/academics/curriculum/electivecourses/index.aspx,
http://law.vanderbilt.edu/academics/curriculum/index.aspx
http://www.vermontlaw.edu/Academics/Degrees/Juris_Doct
or_%28JD%29/First-Year_Curriculum/FirstYear_Spring_Semester.htm,
http://www.vermontlaw.edu/academics/degrees/juris_doctor
_%28jd%29/jd_courses.htm?page=3
http://www.law.villanova.edu/Academics/Degree%20Progra
ms/JD/First%20Year.aspx
http://academics.law.wfu.edu/courses/,
http://academics.law.wfu.edu/degree/jd/
http://washburnlaw.edu/curriculum/
http://law.wlu.edu/academics/page.asp?pageid=1100,
http://law.wlu.edu/academics/page.asp?pageid=1102
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